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A
Director: Frances A. Hill, Ph.D.
The work on the learning of superstitious behaviors in 
animals is reviewed, as is the literature on the learning 
of personal superstitions in humans. Consideration is 
given to controversies regarding the essential nature of 
reinforcement. The demographic and personality correlates 
of superstitious beliefs are reviewed, as is the 
relationship between superstition and locus of control of 
reinforcement. It was hypothesized on theoretical and 
empirical grounds that people with an internal locus of 
control would be more likely than those with an external
locus of control to learn superstitious beliefs and
behaviors when exposed to response independent 
reinforcement in an incidental learning paradigm. Sixty 
eight undergraduates, balanced for locus of control, were 
exposed to response independent reinforcement on an IBM 
microcomputer. Their responses on the keyboard were 
recorded and analyzed for superstitious behaviors.
Superstitious beliefs were assessed via self-report. The
major hypothesis was not supported: Externals were more
likely than internals to develop superstitious beliefs. No 
effect was found for superstitious behaviors. The 
experimental paradigm is critiqued on methodological 
grounds, and suggestions for further work in the area of 
superstitious learning in humans are made.
ii
Locus of Control and Superstition 
Table of Contents
Page
Abstract ii
List of Tables iv
I. Introduction 1
A. Superstitious Behavior in Animals 3
B. The Nature of Superstition in Human Beings 2 3
C. Superstitious Learning in Human Beings 34
D. Superstition and Locus of Control 70
E. Locus of Control and Incidental Learning 76
F. Locus of Control and
Learned Personal Superstitions 85
II. Hypotheses 93
III. Methods 95
A. Subjects 95
B. Apparatus 100
C. Procedures 100
D. Response Measures 101
IV. Results 107
A. Interrater Reliability 107
B. Main Dependent Measures 110
C. Ancillary Dependent Measures 112
V. Discussion 119
VI. Appendices 127
VII. References 155
iii
Locus of Control and Superstition
Table 1
Table 2 
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6 
Table 7
Table 8 
Table 9
List of Tables
Mean Scores on the Internal and Chance 
Subscales of the Levenson Locus of 
Control Scale.
Interrater Reliability Statistics for 
Superstitious Beliefs and Behaviors.
Percent of Internals and Externals 
Displaying Superstitious Beliefs and 
Behaviors.
Means for Main Dependent Measures for 
Female and Male Internals and Externals 
Who Developed Stable Superstitious 
Behaviors.
Percent of Internals and Externals 
Represented in Each of Four Response 
Complexity Categories.
Means for Ancillary Dependent Measures.
Percent of Internals and Externals 
Stating that they Possessed the Ability 
to Type.
Percent of Internals and Externals Using 
Typing Fingering vs. "Hunt and Peck."
Percent of Internals and Externals 
Displaying a Superstitious Behavior 
Without a Corresponding Belief.
Page
99
108
111
113
113
114
117
117
118
iv
Locus of Control and Superstition
1
Introduction
Everybody knows what superstitions are, but few people 
can define them with any degree of precision. Most (if not 
all) of us have had superstitious beliefs or behaviors at 
some point in our lives. Superstitious beliefs and 
behaviors have profound potential for affecting our 
existence. An understanding of superstitions, how they 
develop, how they can be changed or modified, will help us 
to understand the human condition, and possibly help us to 
improve it. In this paper we will address the means by 
which individuals acquire superstitions, and more 
specifically, how personal superstitions can be influenced 
by an individual's locus of control of reinforcement.
We begin by reviewing the work on "superstitious" 
learning in animals, and consider some of the controversy 
surrounding the application of this term to animal 
behavior. We will also allude to the differing opinions as 
to the nature of reinforcement, a subject which will be 
dealt with at length later in the paper. From this brief 
review of the animal literature, we turn to the study of 
superstitions in human beings. After offering a definition 
of superstition, we will review the demographic and 
personality correlates of superstition in the general 
population, and then address superstition in the world of 
sport, which has proven to be fertile ground for
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investigating these beliefs.
In the third section of the introduction, we address 
the literature concerning human learning of superstitious 
behavior. After reviewing some of the early studies, we 
will consider two controversies connected to the phenomenon 
of superstitious learning: the ability of human beings to
detect contingencies between events, and the essential 
nature of reinforcement. We will offer a conceptualization 
of these concerns which will hopefully lay them to rest, or 
at least render them moot. The third section concludes 
with a review of recent studies concerning the learning of 
superstitions in humans.
The fourth section of the introduction is concerned 
with some of the observed correlates between superstition 
and an individual's locus of control. We then explore the 
relationship between locus of control, the illusion of 
control, and cultural and personal superstitions. This 
section concludes with an observation that the relationship 
between incidental learning and locus of control may have a 
bearing on the learning of personal superstitions. In the 
fifth section, we explore some of the cognitive differences 
between internals and externals which may influence 
incidental learning. The relationship between locus of 
control and incidental learning is then addressed. In the 
sixth and final section of the introduction, we explore the 
hypothesis that an individual's locus of control may
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influence their propensity to learn personal superstitions. 
We also consider some of the implications of finding that 
there are in fact differences between internals and 
externals in learning superstitious behaviors. We conclude 
the introduction by looking at the one published study 
performed to date in this area.
Superstitious Behavior in Animals
Work with the response-independent (or noncontingent) 
reinforcement of behavior is generally conceded to have 
begun with B.F. Skinner's (1948) work with pigeons.
However, Skinner's work was presaged by experiments carried 
out by E.R. Guthrie and G.P. Horton (1946) in the previous 
decade. Guthrie and Horton constructed a more elaborate 
and sophisticated version of E.L. Thorndike's puzzle box 
with the stated goal of attempting to determine if the 
behaviors of animals learning to escape from the box 
conformed to the general learning principle of association 
by contiguity. Guthrie and Horton believed that the 
behaviors of cats in escaping from puzzle boxes could be 
explained on the basis of a learned association between 
muscular movements (or impulses to movement) and the 
animal's preceding sense impressions or perceptions.
Between 1936 and 1939 they observed and recorded 
approximately eight hundred escapes from puzzle boxes by 
laboratory cats. What they observed was that their cats
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usually developed highly idiosyncratic and stereotyped 
patterns of behavior as they operated the lever which 
opened the door on the puzzle box. Guthrie and Horton 
noted a distinct tendency for their cats to repeat a series 
of behaviors in remarkable detail, with some of the 
behavioral sequences lasting a minute or more in length. 
They also noted that the the final movements in the series, 
immediately before the cats activated the door-opening 
mechanism, tended to be more stable than the preliminary 
behaviors. They noted that the most accurate prediction of 
a cat's behavior in the box was the observation of what 
behavioral sequences the cat displayed on the previous 
times it found itself in the same situation. Their cats 
repeated the same sequence of behaviors over long series of 
trials, with the result that they were able to cause the 
door of the puzzle box to open, and thus gain egress from 
the box. Guthrie and Horton interpreted this result as 
strong support for the concept of learning by association. 
The stereotyped patterns of behavior which developed came 
to be associated with escape from the box. Guthrie and 
Horton also noted that the stability of the final behaviors 
in the sequence was most likely achieved by virtue of the 
fact that they were protected from unlearning, since 
escaping from the box separated the animal from the 
situation and furnished no opportunity for learning new 
responses. To their credit, they were astute enough to
Locus of Control and Superstition
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point out that although the behavior of cats in the puzzle 
box was explainable in terms of association, their 
observations did not rule out other forms of learning which 
the cats might have employed. Indeed, they held the 
position that association by contiguity was but one method 
by which animals learn patterns of behavior, and was 
perhaps only a relatively minor one. For the purposes of 
the present paper, it is interesting to note not the fact 
that the cats learned to escape from the puzzle box, but 
rather that they developed long and involved stereotypical 
patterns of behavior which they used to open the doors of 
the box, when in fact a simple push on the lever mechanism 
would have sufficed. It was these extraneous patterns of 
behavior which Skinner (1948) was to call superstitious in 
his work with pigeons.
Skinner (1948) discovered that when food was presented 
to pigeons at regular intervals without reference to their 
behavior they developed operantly conditioned responses, 
which were generally oriented toward some environmental 
feature of the operant conditioning chamber. Skinner also 
discovered that higher rates of reinforcement resulted in 
stronger conditioning effects. The behaviors that he 
observed were also highly resistant to extinction. Skinner 
metaphorically described the idiosyncratic and stereotyped 
behaviors he observed in pigeons as superstitious. In that 
original paper, he made an intuitive leap by doubling back
Locus of Control and Superstition
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upon his metaphor, using it to explain the development and 
maintenance of similar behavior in human beings. Skinner 
(1948, 1953) conceptualized superstitions as arising from 
erroneous perceptions of causal connections between one's 
own actions and outside events. The erroneous perceptions 
are the result of accidental contingencies between 
behaviors and reinforcements. The organism behaves as if 
there were a causal relationship between its actions and 
the reinforcements it receives, despite the fact that no 
such causal relationship exists. Skinner (1977) believed 
that a true contingency was not necessary for the 
development of superstitious behavior, but that the only 
necessary relationship between the behavior and its reward 
was one of temporal contiguity; that is, the reward only 
had to follow closely the behavior in a temporal sequence. 
As the behavior increased in frequency, repeated 
adventitious pairings of response and reward strengthened 
the response. Skinner believed that many human 
superstitions exemplify conditioned responses arising from 
these accidental juxtapositions of response and reward. An 
example from his original (1948) work concerns the 
gyrations in which bowlers often engage after releasing the 
ball down the alley. The behaviors cannot affect the 
course of the ball once it is released, but they are 
established and persist because they often are followed by 
desirable outcomes.
Locus of Control and Superstition
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Confirmation and controversy soon followed Skinner's 
(1948) original paper. Kellogg (1949) reported that 
similar kinds of behavior had already been observed in 
orangutans and in dogs, although it had not been labeled as 
superstitious. He objected to describing the types of 
behaviors observed as superstitious, claiming that the 
concept was mentalistic and anthropomorphic. Kellogg 
advocated a conception of the behaviors observed in 
response-independent reinforcement as an association of a 
sequence of movements with a reinforcing stimulus, and 
suggested that they might be regarded as respondent rather 
than operant conditioning. Calling the behaviors 
superstitious implied "that the organism 'believes' it is 
'causing' the food to appear as a result of its reactions" 
(Kellogg, 1949, p. 174), when in fact no such belief had 
been demonstrated.
Despite the early criticism of the theoretical 
formulation, work in the field continued. Morse and 
Skinner (1957) described a second type of superstition 
which they termed sensory superstition. In an experiment 
in which pigeons were reinforced for keypecks on a variable 
interval (VI) schedule, sensory stimuli (such as a colored 
light) presented incidental to the conditioning procedure 
came to control the pigeon's rate of responding. Presence 
of the light could increase or decrease the rate of 
responding, despite the fact that the light did not have
Locus of Control and Superstition
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any causal effect on the ability of the pigeons to obtain 
reinforcement on the VI schedule. In other words, the 
pigeons acted as if the light influenced their ability to 
secure reinforcements from the environment, when in fact it 
did not.
Appel and Hiss (1962) demonstrated that pigeons' rates 
of responding under response-independent reinforcement were 
lower than for response-dependent reinforcement (for FT vs. 
FI schedules), and that responding in the former condition 
never dropped to zero. They concluded from this result 
that pigeons were able to distinguish response-dependent 
from response-independent reinforcement, despite the fact 
that the response-independent reinforcement continued to 
exert an influence on the pigeons' behavior.
A common strategy for investigating superstitious 
responding is to first pre-train organisms in a response- 
dependent reinforcement paradigm, and then to observe their 
behavior under response-independent reinforcement once 
stable responding has been established (Davis & Hubbard, 
1972; Eldridge, Pear, Torgrud, & Evers, 1988; Herrnstein, 
1966; Ono, 1987). Using this pre-training procedure, 
Neuringer (1970) was able to maintain superstitious 
responding in pigeons after training them with as few as 
three response-dependent reinforcements. The birds on the 
pre-training schedule pecked at a higher rate than both a 
response-independent control group, which was not initially
Locus of Control and Superstition
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reinforced for pecking but placed directly on a variable 
time (VT) schedule of reinforcement, and an extinction 
control group that did not receive additional reinforcement 
after the three initial training reinforcements.
Neuringer's results and conclusions, in general, support 
Skinner's (1948) original theory that temporal contiguity 
is sufficient for reinforcement to occur, and more 
specifically, that temporal contiguity is sufficient for 
the development of superstitious behaviors. Neuringer also 
believes that animals often develop superstitious behaviors 
in the natural state because of: 1) the apparent ease of
establishment of superstitious behaviors, and 2) the great 
probability of numerous incidental pairings of behaviors 
and reinforcers occurring in the natural environments of 
animals.
Working with pigeons, Zeiler (1968) compared the pre­
training procedure described above with pure response- 
dependent reinforcement. All of the birds were first 
trained to keypeck on a response-dependent schedule. Half 
of the subjects were then switched to a response- 
independent schedule of reinforcement, while the rest were 
maintained on the response-dependent schedule. Zeiler 
found that response-independent schedules of reinforcement 
maintained the pigeons' keypecking behavior, but at rates 
below the level maintained by continued response-dependent 
reinforcement. Rescorla and Skucy (1969) compared the pre-
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training procedure with traditional extinction procedures 
using rats as subjects. They reported that response- 
independent presentation of food resulted in retarded 
extinction of previously reinforced bar-pressing, compared 
with a normal extinction procedure where no food was 
presented. The behavior did eventually extinguish, 
however. It is interesting to note that Rescorla and Skucy 
did not interpret their results in terms of superstitious 
behavior. Rather, they believed that the retardation in 
extinction resulted from the fact that delivery of 
response-independent food preserved more aspects of the 
original reinforcing situation than did the normal 
extinction procedure. Their results suggest that a pre­
training procedure, despite its relative ease of use, might 
not be a useful paradigm for investigating superstitious 
behavior, since the behaviors maintained under response- 
independent reinforcement following conditioning with 
response^dependent reinforcement may not be due to 
superstitious conditioning at all. Indeed, Davis, Hubbard, 
and Reberg (1973) offer a thoughtful critique of this 
procedure, and suggest that Skinner's original (1948) 
method of inculcating superstitious responding in organisms 
is a more appropriate procedure, despite the greater 
demands it places bn the experimenter.
In reviewing the literature on DRL schedules 
(differential reinforcement of low rates of responding)
Locus of Control and Superstition
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Kramer and Rilling (1970) note that superstitious behavior 
also develops when animals (and humans) are reinforced on 
these schedules. On a DRL schedule a response is 
reinforced only after a minimum interval of time has 
elapsed since the immediately preceding response. Every 
response, whether reinforced or not, begins a new time 
interval. Thus, an organism will receive no reinforcements 
if it maintains a rate of responding such that the elapsed 
time between its responses is less than the time interval 
specified by the DRL schedule (the intertrial response 
time). Kramer and Rilling maintain that the superstitious 
behaviors observed on DRL schedules increase in probability 
because they closely precede reinforced responses. Laties, 
Weiss, and Weiss (1969) believe that the observed behaviors 
help the organism gauge the passage of time and distribute 
its responses so as to obtain the maximum number of 
reinforcements available under the DRL schedule. This type 
of behavior has also been termed mediating or collateral 
behavior (Kramer & Rilling, 1970; Laties et al., 1969) and 
there is some question as to whether or not it is 
appropriate to call it superstitious in the same sense that 
the term is used in the animal literature. (See Lyon,
1982, for a discussion of the differences between 
superstitious behavior, mediating behavior, collateral 
behavior, and adjunctive behavior in the realm of operant 
reinforcement.) In a more recent investigation, Gleeson
Locus of Control and Superstition
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and Lattal (1987) found that response rates were lower 
under a response-independent schedule of reinforcement than 
under a DRL schedule. Their results were consistent with 
an emphasis on temporal contiguity as the important factor 
in response maintenance.
Beginning in the early 1970's serious questions were 
raised about the adequacy of the explanations of animal 
superstitions in terms of incidental or adventitious 
reinforcement by the mechanism of temporal contiguity, as 
postulated by Skinner (1948, 1953, 1977; see also 
Herrnstein, 1966). Staddon and Simmelhag (1971) found that 
response-independent reinforcement does not necessarily 
produce the idiosyncratic superstitious behaviors observed 
by Skinner. In replicating Skinner's (1948) work, they 
reported that two classes of behaviors were reliably 
produced: terminal responses and interim activities.
Terminal responses were behaviors that consistently 
occurred just before food delivery, such as pecking 
behavior or orienting the body to face the food hopper. 
Terminal responses were conceptualized in terms of 
consummatory responses emitted in anticipation of obtaining 
a food reward. Interim activities were all those behaviors 
which preceded terminal responses. Staddon and Simmelhag 
equated these interim activities with the superstitious 
behaviors observed by Skinner. Terminal responses occurred 
almost exclusively just prior to food delivery. Thus, the
Locus of Control and Superstition
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temporal contiguity between the superstitious behavior and 
reinforcement required by Skinner's interpretation rarely 
happened. Staddon and Simmelhag believed the interim 
activities that they observed were a type of mediating 
behavior, behavior which was interposed between two 
instances of food reward and functioned as a stimulus for 
the terminal responses, the responses which were actually 
in close proximity (temporally) to the rewards received.
In other words, interim activities helped the pigeons to 
properly space their terminal responses a few seconds 
apart. Mediating behavior is often observed in spaced- 
responding schedules (Lyon, 1982; Staddon and Simmelhag, 
1971). Staddon and Simmelhag note that the type of interim 
activities displayed by an organism are generally specific 
to that species. In their work, they observed that the 
type of behaviors which were reliably developed in response 
to response-independent reinforcement were predictable, 
based upon a knowledge of the types of behaviors which were 
common in the species' behavioral repertoire. They propose 
that the behaviors observed by Skinner and others were 
actually terminal responses, emitted in anticipation of 
food, and/or interim activities which occurred just after 
instances of food delivery, and were not due to 
superstitious conditioning.
Staddon and Ayres (1975) replicated the work of 
Staddon and Simmelhag (1971) using rats as subjects, and
Locus of Control and Superstition
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found that regular temporal sequences of activities 
developed during the interfood intervals. After consuming 
a food pellet, their subjects tended to drink water, run on 
a running wheel, and then to anticipate delivery of another 
food pellet by spending time in close proximity to the 
feeder. The activities at the end of each interval were 
usually related to the consummatory pattern associated with 
food, such as pawing and gnawing on the feeder. Staddon 
and Ayres consider their results to be convincing evidence 
arguing against the development of superstitious behavior 
as a result of incidental reinforcement.
Working with pigeons, Timberlake and Lucas (1985) 
investigated the disparity between the temporal contiguity 
theory of the development of superstitious behavior 
(Herrnstein, 1966; Skinner, 1948, 1953, 1977) and the 
stimulus substitution/elicited behavior interpretation 
(Staddon and Simmelhag, 1971; Staddon and Ayres, 1975).
The consistency of the behavior patterns observed by 
Timberlake and Lucas argued against the incidental learning 
by temporal contiguity hypothesis, and they believed that 
the complexity of the behavior was incompatible with a 
simple stimulus-substitution account. They concluded that 
the so-called superstitious behaviors seen under response- 
independent reinforcement probably developed from species- 
specific patterns of appetitive behavior related to 
foraging and feeding, and that contiguity of behavior and
Locus of Control and Superstition
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reward appeared unlikely to have been the primary basis of 
behavior change. In addition, they did not find support 
for Staddon and Simmelhag's and Staddon and Ayres' 
classification of behavior into interim activities and 
terminal responses. Instead, Timberlake and Lucas (198 5) 
argue that "what has been called superstitious behavior in 
the pigeon actually represents expression of pre-organized 
response patterns elicited by periodic [response- 
independent] delivery of food" (p. 295). In short, they 
view these behaviors as elicited species-specific behaviors 
related to securing and consuming food.
Despite the serious criticisms raised by Staddon and 
Simmelhag (1971) and Timberlake and Lucas (1985), many 
researchers continued work in the area of animal 
superstition and continued to conceptualize their work as 
reflecting basic principles of operant reinforcement. 
Eldridge et al. (1988) obtained feeder wall-directed 
behavior with their pigeons when they were reinforced on a 
fixed time (FT) 15 sec schedule, similar to the behavior 
observed by Timberlake and Lucas. Eldridge et al., 
however, interpret their results (and the results of 
Timberlake and Lucas) in light of superstitious responding: 
Specifically, they point out that "there was an explicit 
reinforcement contingency for being close to the feeder 
wall at the time of food delivery: (1) reinforcement was
more immediate, and (2) more food could be obtained because
Locus of Control and Superstition
16
the feeder was available for a limited time during each 
reinforcement” (Eldridge et al., 1988, p. 283). Thus, 
although their birds (and those of Timberlake and Lucas and 
Staddon and Simmelhag) developed similar behavior as a 
result of response-independent reinforcement, these 
similarities can be explained on the basis of their utility 
in gaining access to the food available. Further, Eldridge 
et al. point out that feeder wall directed behavior could 
be an artifact of the hopper training to which the birds 
were subjected prior to participation in the experiment.
Davis and Platt (1983) point out that the differences 
in the behaviors observed in many of the above cited 
studies may result from measurement problems inherent in 
response-independent reinforcement procedures. Under such 
conditions, the number of behaviors or responses available 
to an organism is unbounded, as are the potential units of 
behavior which may be selected for analysis. Researchers 
may reach differing conclusions depending upon which 
aspects of the organism's behavior they choose to 
emphasize. Working with rats, Davis and Platt tried to 
attenuate this difficulty by suspending a response lever 
vertically from the ceiling of an operant conditioning 
chamber. Thus, they were able to specify a class of 
behaviors (lever pressing) for observation and analysis, 
but the value of the response, in this case the direction 
of the lever press throughout 360 degrees, was free to
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vary. When food was presented to their rats in response to 
a lever press but independent of the direction of the press 
or the position of the subject, the subjects did not 
develop preferred orientations or directions of presses. 
However, when Davis and Platt differentially reinforced 
their subjects for direction of lever pressing, they were 
then able to maintain this behavior with a response- 
independent schedule of reinforcement. They interpreted 
their results as demonstrating that a response-reinforcer 
contingency was necessary for acquisition of behavior, but 
that contiguity alone was sufficient for maintenance of 
behavior. They point out, however, that their results 
should not be taken as evidence against the sufficiency of 
a response-reinforcer contiguity in the acquisition of a 
behavior. They believe that a "response-reinforcer 
contiguity [may be] a sufficient condition for increasing 
the frequency of a response, but a contingency may be 
necessary to ensure reliable temporal contiguity between 
reinforcer presentations and a particular response" (Davis 
& Platt, 1983, p. 509). Superstitious conditioning, where 
response-reinforcer contingencies are absent, might thus be 
found in situations involving faster acquisition or fewer 
response alternatives. (The controversy regarding the 
roles of temporal contiguity and response-reinforcer 
contingency in the operant conditioning of behavior is a 
subject which is addressed below in connection with
Locus of Control and Superstition
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superstitious learning in human beings.)
Lieberman (1986), working with pigeons, demonstrated a 
form of sensory superstition involving the marking 
hypothesis. Pigeons were occasionally reinforced after a 
ten second delay for pecking a split key. Both sides of 
the key were reinforced, but pecks to one side of the key 
which resulted in food delivery were marked with a colored 
light if they were pecked a second time during the ten 
second delay initiated by the first keypeck. Under these 
conditions, pigeons developed a notable preference for 
pecking either the left or right side of the split key, 
depending on which side was marked by the colored light, 
despite the fact that pecks to both sides of the key were 
reinforced under the same schedule. Lieberman (1986) notes 
that "there was no contingency between the subjects' choice 
response and reinforcement— food was presented regardless 
of which side was pecked— but a strong side preference 
emerged nevertheless" (p. 349). He interprets this result 
as strong evidence supporting the key role of contiguity in 
learning. Contiguity, however, has to be interpreted 
within the framework of memory. "It is the contiguity 
between events in working memory that is crucial, rather 
than contiguity in the real world" (Lieberman, 1986, 
p. 458). Marking a response makes it more salient in the 
working memory of the organism, and thus enhances its role 
in superstitious operant conditioning. "The physical
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contiguity of a response and a reinforcer may be important 
in determining whether the response is remembered and, if 
it is, whether it will be identified as the causal agent" 
(Lieberman, 1986, p. 4 58).
The pattern of conflicting results and interpretations 
seen in studies of pigeons has been repeated in those 
studies which have used rats as subjects. Using rats,
Davis and Hubbard (1972) replicated the work of Skinner
(1948). They observed repeated, stereotyped patterns of 
behavior under all of the schedules of response-independent 
food delivery they used. However, superstitious responding 
emerged more rapidly and was more stable under FT schedules 
than under VT schedules. Davis and Hubbard also observed a 
notable change or drift in the topography of the responses 
obtained under VT schedules, which was accelerated under 
extinction procedures. They interpreted their results as 
supportive of the interpretation of superstitious behavior 
induced via the mechanism of temporal contiguity, in line 
with the work of Skinner. They further endorse the idea 
that while temporal contiguity may be sufficient to induce 
behavior in organisms, contingency may be instrumental in 
producing reliable contiguities between responses and 
reinforcements (see also Davis and Platt, 1983, cited 
above). Davis and Hubbard end their paper with a 
discussion of the inter-relationships between contiguity, 
contingency, and the phenomenon of behavioral drift,
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concluding that a temporal contiguity is the best evidence 
an organism has regarding contingencies between responses 
and rewards. Thus, organisms sometime behave as if a 
contingency exists between responses and rewards, when in 
fact one does not. Davis and Hubbard regard this 
phenomenon, where temporal contiguity is sufficient to 
reinforce behavior in the absence of a contingency, as the 
prototypical example of superstitious behavior.
Devenport (1979) and Devenport and Holloway (1980) 
noted that rats with surgically-induced bilateral 
hippocampal lesions were much more likely to develop 
superstitious behaviors than were rats with intact 
hippocampi. Their intact rats showed a high degree of 
behavioral drift when exposed to response-independent 
reinforcement after a pre-training exercise, whereas the 
hippocampal rats did not. Devenport and Holloway concluded 
that the hippocampus was instrumental in introducing 
variation into the rat's behavioral repertoire, variation 
which was responsible for the drift in behavior observed in 
intact rats. Devenport and Holloway surmise that the 
variation in behavior so induced allowed their intact rats 
to separate contingent relationships between behaviors and 
environmental reinforcements, on one hand, from mere 
temporal pairings of behaviors and reinforcements, on the 
other. As behavioral responses slowly change, any 
incidental relationships between responses and
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reinforcements will be exposed, and the responses, no 
longer adventitiously reinforced, will fade from the rat's 
repertoire. Devenport and Holloway surmise that this 
process operates in all mammals, which have relatively 
large hippocampi, as opposed to birds, which have small 
hippocampi. The hippocampus may thus be implicated in the 
differing propensities to learn superstitious behaviors 
which are observed between different species.
The most recently published investigation into the 
area of response-independent reinforcement is that of 
Justice and Looney (1990), who proposed to investigate the 
discrepancies between the results of Skinner (1948),
Staddon and Simmelhag (1971), and Timberlake and Lucas 
(1985). Justice and Looney noted that the behavior 
patterns they obtained differed markedly across subjects. 
They did not find the terminal pecking behaviors reported 
by Staddon and Simmelhag, nor did they find the consistent 
wall-directed behavior reported by Timberlake and Lucas. 
Justice and Looney (1990) note that their data were 
"consistent with, though not an adequate test of, Skinner's 
position" (p. 65). In their discussion, they go on to 
point out that all three processes proposed to account for 
superstitious behaviors may have an influence on 
responding, and that the "behaviors observed may be ' 
influenced in an important way by the theoretical view held 
by the observer" (Justice & Looney, 1990, p. 66). They
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note that reinforcers have multiple effects, and it may be 
that the desired behavioral effect may be achieved by the 
proper specification of schedules of reinforcement and 
environmental contingencies. Thus, it may be possible to 
engender practically any type of behavior in animals that 
one might wish, by specifying the proper combination of 
schedules of reinforcement and environmental circumstances.
From this brief review it can be seen that the 
questions surrounding superstitious behavior in animals 
have not yet been laid to rest. Controversy continues 
concerning the basic nature of reinforcement, whether a 
causal relationship between response and reward is 
necessary for reinforcement to occur, whether temporal 
contiguity is sufficient for reinforcement to occur, or 
whether some other processes are at work as well. This 
subject will be further addressed below in the context of 
human superstitious learning. The concept of superstition 
itself, at least as it applies to animals, continues to be 
controversial. Indeed, following the lead of Kellogg
(1949), one can question whether or not animals can truly 
be said to have superstitions. We have no firm evidence 
that animals can form beliefs, despite the fact that they 
might display behaviors that we would associate with 
superstitious beliefs in humans.
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The Nature of Superstition in Human Beings
Given the confusion in the animal literature as to the 
essential nature of the phenomenon of superstition, it is 
instructive to turn to Webster's Third International (Gove, 
1966) for a commonly accepted definition of superstition 
which would be useful with humans: Superstition is "a
belief, conception, act, or practice resulting from 
ignorance... or a false conception of causation" (p. 2296). 
An alternative definition is "a fixed irrational idea: a 
notion maintained in spite of evidence to the contrary" 
(Gove, 1966, p. 2296). This definition emphasizes the 
cognitive component of superstition, but acknowledges that 
a behavioral component also exists. Belief in a 
superstition presumably leads to superstitious behavior 
(Plug, 1975b). Since superstition involves beliefs, 
conceptions, and ideas, it seems inappropriate to use the 
term in regard to animal behavior, since we are unable to 
demonstrate convincingly that animals possess these 
constructs. The conceptions of animal behavior in other 
terms, noted above, may be more fruitful.
The phenomenon of superstition in human beings has 
suffered from definitional difficulties (Plug, 1975b), as 
may be surmised from the definition offered above. A 
definition of superstition similar to the one quoted above 
and one that is often cited in the literature is that of
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Jahoda (1969): Superstition is an irrational belief that
"one's fate is in the hands of unknown external powers 
governed by forces over which one has no control" (p. 116) . 
This definition, however, is too all-encompassing to 
properly distinguish superstitions from other beliefs and 
behaviors which may be similar to superstitions, but which 
most people would not intuitively classify as such. For 
example, religious beliefs would generally not be called 
superstitious, despite the fact that they fit the 
definitions offered above (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1983; 
Herrnstein, 1966; Plug, 1975b). Indeed, Jahoda (1969) 
notes that "one man's religion is another man's 
superstition" and "there is no objective means of 
distinguishing superstition from other types of beliefs and 
actions" (pp. 2, 9). Eitzen and Sage (1978) draw a useful 
distinction between superstition and religion. They 
observe that religion is the reverent worship of deities 
and supernatural forces which focuses on ultimate, 
existential issues concerning human existence: the meaning
and purpose of life, the question of life after death, the 
proper moral relationship between an individual and other 
human beings, etc. Superstition, on the other hand, is a 
utilitarian attitude which is concerned with achieving 
practical, secular goals in the everyday life of an 
individual through the means of manipulation of fate or 
supernatural forces, and it is used for individual,
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practical ends. This distinction is still not clear, for 
prayer is a religious activity which is often invoked to 
achieve private, worldly ends (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981). 
Indeed, prayer and other religious practices have at times 
been defined as superstitious behavior by some 
investigators (Buhrmann, Brown, & Zaugg, 1982; Buhrmann & 
Zaugg, 1981, 1983; Gregory, 1975; Gregory & Petrie, 1972, 
1975) . Other researchers have specifically excluded 
religious practices from their investigations of 
superstitious behavior (Neil, Anderson, & Sheppard, 1981), 
even to the point of suggesting that superstitious and 
religious practices are separate phenomena (Ellis, 1988) .
In this context, it is interesting to note that among 
basketball players in southern Alberta, more frequent 
church attendance is correlated with a greater likelihood 
of endorsing superstitious beliefs and practices (Buhrmann 
& Zaugg, 1983).
Scheibe (1970) offers some interesting insights to the 
concept of superstition: "A superstition may be said to
exist whenever an individual persistently or repeatedly 
behaves as if his subjective estimate of the result of that 
behavior is significantly different from an objective 
(scientific) estimate of the effect of that behavior" (p. 
123). He notes that superstitions arise because of an 
imperfect knowledge of antecedent-consequent relationships. 
Cause and effect relationships are not something that we
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can perceive directly, rather they are inferences based on 
contiguity: contiguity in space, in time, or both. Given 
the uncertain state of our knowledge, superstitions act to 
fill the gap between our subjective estimates of the causal 
relationships between events and the objective probability 
reflecting the state of affairs in the external 
environment. Such beliefs help give us a basis for action, 
so that we are not paralyzed by doubt and uncertainty. We 
misrepresent accidental contiguities as essential 
contingencies and take fortuitous events as causes. Thus, 
we are able to act in the face of uncertainty.
For the purposes of this study, keeping in mind the 
conceptual difficulties involved in defining the concept, a 
superstition will be defined as an irrational belief that a 
causal relationship exists between one's behavior and 
obtaining a desired outcome (or avoiding an undesirable 
outcome), when in fact no such causal relationship exists. 
Such beliefs are accompanied by corresponding behaviors 
which reflect the efficacy of the belief. Widely held 
actions and beliefs generally sanctioned by the culture or 
subculture in which the individual resides, such as prayer 
and other religious beliefs, will be specifically excluded 
from the definition. (See Plug, 1975b, for a more detailed 
discussion of the definition of superstition.)
At this point it is useful to draw a distinction 
between personal superstitions and cultural superstitions
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(Higgins, Morris, & Johnson, 1989). "Some superstitions 
are widely held, a social heritage of beliefs taught us by 
our elders, but others are private convictions arising... 
from valid personal experiences" (Keller & Schoenfeld,
1950, p. 102). Cultural superstitions are those which are 
socially transmitted and shared by several (or many) 
individuals (Herrnstein, 1966; Scheibe, 1970; Skinner,
1953). An example of a cultural superstition is the common 
one ascribing good luck to four-leaf clovers or to carrying 
a rabbit's foot. Such superstitions are learned from other 
individuals in one's society, and may be maintained by 
cultural beliefs and/or by accidental reinforcement. 
Personal superstitions, however, are those which are 
peculiar to the individual, and not generally shared with 
others (Herrnstein, 1966; Skinner, 1953) . Indeed, 
sometimes sharing personal superstitions is said to cause 
them to lose their effectiveness (Buhrmann, Brown, & Zaugg, 
1982; Womack, 1979). Personal superstitions may be 
consciously and deliberately adopted by an individual, they 
may be learned incidentally from accidental contingencies 
in the environment, or they may be transmitted culturally 
(Peterson, 1978). The type of superstitions addressed by 
Skinner (1948) in his discussion of the effects of 
response-independent reinforcement on behavior are personal 
superstitions, although some theoreticians believe that 
some cultural superstitions may arise in the same manner
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(Herrnstein, 1966). Jahoda (1969) agrees with Skinner that 
personal superstitions have their genesis in incidental 
learning, but he points out that they also have a component 
of belief. Ferster, Culbertson, & Boren (1975) note that 
these incidentally learned superstitions can be highly 
resistant to extinction because of the intermittent 
reinforcement schedules under which they are learned.
Most investigators believe that superstitions may have 
adaptive value, as least if they are not too extreme. 
Superstitions are most often seen in situations of fear 
and/or uncertainty, and they help to reduce anxiety (Blum & 
Blum, 1974; Malinowski, 1954; Neil, 1975; Singer & Benassi, 
1981; Tupper & Williams, 1986). Superstitious behaviors 
are more likely to be learned in situations containing high 
levels of chance occurrences, anxiety, uncertainty, and 
unpredictability, where the results are greatly desired 
(Becker, 1975; Ferster, Culbertson, & Boren, 1975; Gregory 
and Petrie, 1972; Neil, Anderson, & Sheppard, 1981; Womack, 
1979) . Within any given area of endeavor, those activities 
which involve higher degrees of chance and more uncertain 
outcomes are more likely to have superstitions associated 
with them (Gmelch, 1972). For example, among the Trobriand 
Islanders, there are are numerous superstitious practices 
associated with fishing the open ocean, an activity fraught 
with danger and uncertainty, while there are none 
associated with fishing in protected lagoons (Malinowski,
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1954). Superstitious beliefs and behaviors can give one a 
feeling of partial control over a situation and thus help 
to improve self-confidence, self-assurance, and feelings of 
competence (Becker, 1975; Gmelch, 1978; Neil, 1975).
Superstitions appear to be efforts to gain control 
over unpredictable situations by engaging in behaviors 
which appeal to fate, luck, chance, or other forces 
generally conceived to lie outside causal relationships.
The superstitions may thus alleviate feelings of 
helplessness and anxiety. However, superstitions rarely 
intrude upon or supplant rational, empirical approaches to 
problem solving, where such approaches suffice in achieving 
desired ends (Singer & Benassi, 1981). Social and 
environmental threat, such as unemployment, financial 
uncertainty, political unrest, war, etc., can increase the 
level of superstition in the general population (Padgett & 
Jorgenson, 1982; Singer & Benassi, 1981).
Most researchers studying superstitions in the general 
population have failed to draw a distinction between 
personal and cultural superstitions. The two concepts are 
usually considered under the same category of common 
superstitious beliefs. Typical findings in this area of 
research include the fact that superstition declines with 
increasing levels of education. Low, negative correlations 
between intelligence and superstition are commonly reported 
(Blum & Blum, 1974; Killen, Wildman, & Wildman, 1974; Plug,
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1975b). People in lower socio-economic strata tend to 
endorse more superstitions than people in higher strata 
(Plug, 1975b). According to Plug (1975b), no firm 
conclusions can be drawn with respect to the relationship 
between superstition and age. Some researchers have found 
increases in superstitiousness with increasing age (e.g., 
Ramamurti & Jamuna, 1987), some that levels of superstition 
decline with age (e.g., Plug, 1975a), while others have 
found no correlation (e.g. Blum & Blum, 1974).
Contradictory results in this area may be due to 
difficulties in defining and measuring superstitions, to 
the different populations studied, or to confounds with 
educational level or other factors (Plug, 1975b). Some 
researchers think that there may be a low-level correlation 
between psychopathology and belief in superstitions:
’’there might be some tendency for emotionally unstable 
people to believe more readily in superstitions” (Plug, 
1975b, p. 108). Finally, women have been demonstrated to 
be more superstitious than men in numerous studies (Blum, 
1976; Blum & Blum, 1974; Plug, 1975a, 1975b; Ramamurti & 
Jamuna, 1987), although in a study of Australian university 
students Tupper and Williams (1986) found no differences 
between the two sexes.
One of the most fertile fields for studying 
superstitions has been the field of sport (as noted by B.F. 
Skinner in 1948). Although popular accounts of
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superstitious behavior by athletes have been in vogue for 
years, sustained systematic study in the area did not 
commence until the early 1970's (Buhrmann & Zaugg, 1981; 
Gregory & Petrie, 1972, 1975; Neil, Anderson, & Sheppard, 
1981). Becker (1975) observed the following common sport- 
related superstitions: the use of "lucky” clothing,
charms, or numbers; practices which help prevent or cure 
injury; and superstitions related to care and use of 
equipment. Womack (1979) observes that sports participants 
perceive a direct link between their superstitious 
behaviors and the outcome of the games in which they are 
involved. Neil (1975) notes that athletes say that they do 
what seems to have worked best for them in the past. He 
considers this observation an endorsement of Skinner's 
incidental learning paradigm for the learning of 
superstitions. Neil points out that the partial 
reinforcement commonly found in superstitiously learned 
behaviors makes them relatively resistant to extinction.
He also notes that "many individual superstitions originate 
from repetition of acts associated with a previous success 
or the avoidance of acts associated with previous failures" 
(Neil, Anderson, & Sheppard, 1981, p. 140). These 
superstitious behaviors bother players if they are omitted 
from their behavioral repertoires.
In two separate studies, Gregory and Petrie (1972,
1975) surveyed several hundred college students, both
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athletes and non-athletes, and discovered that the more 
athletes were involved with their sport, the more 
superstitions they endorsed in regard to that sport. This 
finding is in accord with the observation that 
superstitious behaviors are more likely to occur in those 
areas where the results are important to the individual 
holding the superstition (Ferster, Culbertson, & Boren,
1975). The more important the result, and the more 
uncertain the activity, the greater the tendency to 
superstitious behavior. Buhrmann and Zaugg (1981) and 
Neil, Anderson, and Sheppard (1981) also report that 
increasing levels of superstition within a given sport are 
correlated with increased commitment to that sport.
Gregory and Petrie (1972, 1975) also found that athletes 
held more sport-related superstitions than non-athletes, 
and fewer general cultural superstitions. They also 
discovered that women, both athletes and non-athletes, 
endorsed more cultural superstitions than did men. Men 
from both groups tended to endorse more sport-related 
superstitions than did women. Buhrmann and Zaugg (1981) 
also found that females were more likely to subscribe to 
superstitious beliefs and behaviors, although Buhrmann, 
Brown, and Zaugg (1982) were unable to find any differences 
between men and women in the number of superstitions they 
endorsed or their overall level of superstitiousness. They 
do note, however, that females were more likely than males
Locus of Control and Superstition
33
to endorse the importance of team mascots for bringing 
luck. Gregory and Petrie found that female athletes 
endorsed more superstitions relating to personal appearance 
(e.g. lucky clothing or hair accessories) and socially 
related functions than did male athletes. Male athletes 
endorsed more superstitions related to equipment. Gregory 
and Petrie concluded from the pattern of superstitions they 
observed that most sport-related superstitions were 
transmitted within the social structures of each individual 
sport.
Gmelch (1972, 1978) noted three classes of 
superstitious behavior in sport: rituals, taboos, and 
fetishes. A ritual is a prescribed stereotypical series of 
behaviors in which an individual engages in order to ensure 
that a desired outcome is achieved. An example might be 
the baseball player who takes exactly the same route to the 
baseball stadium on the day of home games and dresses in 
exactly the same sequence for every game. Womack (1979) 
observes that rituals help to promote a controlled state of 
excitement, which may in turn facilitate performance.
Taboos are prohibitions on certain behaviors or things 
before undertaking or during an endeavor (Gmelch, 1972,
1978) . Examples include prohibitions on mentioning a no­
hitter during a baseball game, allowing bats to cross each 
other when lying on the ground, or scrupulously avoiding 
certain foods before playing a game. A fetish is a
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material object believed to embody supernatural powers that 
aid or protect the owner (Gmelch, 1978). Examples are 
lucky clothing, charms, or equipment. Gmelch observes that 
superstitions often grow out of associations (due to 
temporal contiguity) between environmental circumstances 
and exceptionally poor or exceptionally good performances. 
He also notes that in baseball, superstitions are most 
often observed in those areas in which the player is least 
sure of obtaining desirable outcomes: pitching and
hitting. Fielding, where the player has almost complete 
control over the outcome (Gmelch, 1978), is rarely the 
subject of superstitious belief or behavior.
Superstitious Learning in Human Beings
Skinner's conceptualization of superstitions as 
arising from incidental response-independent reinforcement 
has been fruitfully applied by several investigators to 
induce or maintain superstitions (and superstitious 
behavior) in human beings. Indeed, operant researchers 
have offered definitions of superstitious behavior based 
entirely on this conceptualization. Catania (1968) defined 
superstition as "the modification or maintenance of 
behavior as a consequence of accidental (also adventitious, 
incidental, or spurious) relationships between responses 
and reinforcements, as opposed to those that are either 
explicitly or implicitly arranged” (p. 347). Ferster,
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Culbertson, and Boren (1975) state that superstitious 
behaviors are behaviors which are established, changed or 
maintained by an accidental relationship between 
reinforcers and performance, when these relationships are 
based on temporal contiguity, and not causal connections. 
Herrnstein (1966) also holds that superstitions are the 
result of adventitious reinforcement due to temporal 
contiguity. In reviewing the research on superstitious 
behavior with children, Zeiler (1972) defines superstitions 
as "behaviors which are emitted as if they have
environmental consequences, but in fact do not" (p. 2). He
believes that the phenomenon of superstitious behavior is
the best evidence that temporal relationships between
responses and reinforcing stimuli are critical in 
reinforcement.
In accord with this conception of superstition, and 
despite serious questions about Skinner's intuitive leap 
from the idiosyncratic and stereotypical behavior he 
observed in pigeons to theories about the genesis of such 
behavior in animals, adventitious or incidental 
reinforcement has been demonstrated to result in 
superstitious behavior in humans. For example, 
investigators have demonstrated superstitious behavior in 
university undergraduates using concurrent schedules of 
reinforcement, where distinct key pressing responses were 
maintained by independent schedules of reinforcement
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(Catania & Cutts, 1963). In an incidental learning 
paradigm where subjects were able to respond to two keys, 
only one of which was reinforced, superstitious responses 
were maintained on the key which was not reinforced.
Subjects even claimed to have learned, (erroneously) the
(
correct sequence of key strokes on the two keys which 
resulted in reinforcement, when, in fact, only a single 
keystroke on one key was rewarded.
Similar results have been obtained by Bruner and 
Revusky (1961) working with high school students, and by 
Zeiler (1970) in work with children. Bruner and Revusky 
reinforced high school students on a DRL schedule of 
reinforcement for responding on one of four telegraph keys. 
They obtained concurrent behavior (which they discussed in 
terms of collateral mediating behavior) on the other three 
keys, despite the fact that responding on the other three 
keys was not reinforced. (Randolph, 1965, replicated these 
results with college students.) Kramer and Rilling (1970) 
suggest that the behavior obtained by Bruner and Revusky 
was essentially superstitious in nature, rather than 
collateral. Some of the patterns of keypresses that Bruner 
and Revusky obtained from their subjects were maladaptive, 
in that they included extraneous keypresses on the 
reinforced key. Of course, extraneous presses occurring 
early in the intertrial response time under the DRL 
schedule resulted in the subjects' losing some of the
Locus of Control and Superstition
37
possible reinforcements. Bruner and Revusky's subjects 
stated that these sequences of keypresses (even the ones 
which were less than optimal, in light of the DRL schedule) 
were necessary for them to obtain reinforcement. The 
incorporation of keypresses on the reinforced key into 
their behavior may be taken as a measure of the strength of 
the reinforcement procedure and its ability to induce 
superstitious behavior in subjects.
Stein and Landis (1973), in an extension of the work 
of Bruner and Revusky (1961) and Randolph (1965), 
demonstrated that suppression of the superstitious behavior 
developed by human subjects reinforced on DRL schedules 
resulted in disruptions in their behavior and prevented 
them from obtaining reinforcements in an efficacious 
manner. Stein and Landis believe that the superstitious 
behavior was essential in maintaining efficient performance 
in those subjects in which it occurred, and that it 
developed as a result of incidental or adventitious 
reinforcement. They ascribed to it a regulatory or pacing 
function which helped the subjects properly space their 
responses under the DRL schedule, similar to the 
interpretation of Laties, Weiss, and Weiss (1969) and 
contrary to the interpretation of Kramer and Rilling 
(1970), who do not consider this type of behavior to be 
mediating or collateral behavior. Following Lyon (1982), 
this disagreement as to the nature of the behavior cannot
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be resolved without recourse to experimental procedures not 
used by Stein and Landis (nor by Bruner and Revusky or 
Randolph). Lyon suggests that the distinctions between 
superstitious behavior, mediating behavior, and collateral 
behavior under a DRL schedule depend on the observation 
that superstitious behavior continues unabated when the DRL 
schedule is changed to an FT schedule. Stein and Landis 
did not include this manipulation in their experimental 
protocol.
Working with children, Zeiler (1970) demonstrated that 
DRO schedules of reinforcement can result in superstitious 
behaviors. A DRO schedule is defined as differential 
reinforcement of other responding, which, as Zeiler (1970) 
points out, may be better phrased as "differential 
reinforcement of pausing" (p. 149). Under a DRO schedule, 
reinforcement is provided when a specific response is not 
emitted for a specified period of time. For example, 
rewards would be given provided that a subject did not 
press a button for a specified number of seconds. Under 
such a procedure, Zeiler's subjects ceased responding on a 
key that controlled the DRO schedule, while at the same 
time they developed complex, stereotyped sequences of other 
behaviors. Most of these behaviors involved pressing a key 
which had no effect on reinforcement (as planned in his 
experimental design) but also included observation and 
exploratory behavior. In discussing his results, Zeiler
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noted that stereotyped behavior which did not produce 
reinforcement has been demonstrated under various other 
schedules of reinforcement (discussed previously). He 
concluded that the production of such superstitious 
responses "is not a special characteristic of any schedule 
but may be a general consequence of reinforcement," and 
this in turn suggests that "it may be that adventitious 
reinforcement is at least partially responsible for the 
individual differences often observed in behavior" (Zeiler, 
1970, p. 154).
Weisberg and Kennedy (1969) investigated the effect of 
response-independent reinforcement in maintaining 
children's behavior which had been previously established 
using variable interval (VI) and variable ratio (VR) 
schedules. The ages of their subjects ranged from 24 to 60 
months. In two separate experiments, Weisberg and Kennedy 
trained their subjects to press a lever to obtain a snack 
(crackers, marshmallows, chocolate chips, etc.). In the 
first experiment, subjects were initially reinforced on a 
VI 30-second schedule with a 10 second limited hold. 
Subsequently, subjects were exposed to a VT 3 0-second 
schedule of response-independent reinforcement. In the 
second experiment, subjects were reinforced on a VR 15- 
second schedule, followed by an FT schedule where the exact 
spacing of reinforcement was based on the average rate of 
reinforcement obtained under the VR 15 schedule. In both
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experiments, some subjects were switched from the pre­
training condition directly to an extinction condition. 
Weisberg and Kennedy discovered that response-independent 
reinforcement following a pre-training exercise reliably 
maintained the previously established behavior. Response 
rates were lower than during acquisition, but higher than 
during extinction. They concluded that their subjects were 
less likely to detect a change in the programming 
contingencies because response-independent reinforcement 
retained more of the stimulus features of the response- 
dependent reinforcement condition than did the extinction 
procedure. Zeiler (1972), discussing these results in 
terms of superstitious behavior, points out that they "show 
that stimuli which reinforce behavior when presented 
according to response-dependent schedules also reinforce 
behavior when presented independently of responses" (p. 9) . 
Zeiler further notes that decreases in the rates of 
responding under response-independent schedules following a 
pre-training exercise can be explained by the phenomenon of 
behavioral drift, and that this phenomenon is an important 
difference between response-dependent and response- 
independent schedules of reinforcement.
In stark contrast to the study by Weisberg and Kennedy 
(1969), two separate studies by Poresky (1969/1970, 1971, 
1975) demonstrated that exposure to a response-independent 
schedule of reinforcement following a pre-training exercise
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resulted in a much lower rate of responding than did a 
traditional extinction procedure. Poresky was attempting 
to demonstrate that human beings were capable of detecting 
causal, contingent relationships between events. (Previous 
studies, reviewed below, had indicated that humans were not 
good at making such discriminations.) In a study using 
infants ranging in age from 10 to 14 months, Poresky (1975) 
first continuously reinforced subjects for panel-pressing 
by the sound of a chime and the appearance of a light.
After demonstrating acquisition of the panel-pressing 
behavior, the infants were placed on either a response- 
independent schedule of reinforcement (VT 10-second) or a 
classic extinction schedule where no reinforcements were 
available. Poresky found that the infants' rates of 
responding were significantly lower under the response- 
independent reinforcement schedule than under the 
extinction schedule. He regarded these results as support 
for the theory that infants are able to detect the presence 
or absence of causal, contingent relationships between 
their behaviors and the reinforcements they receive from 
the environment, and also that they react differently to 
such perceived contingencies. He also concluded that 
response-independent reinforcement was a more effective 
technique for suppressing behavior than classic extinction 
procedures where all reinforcements are withheld. These 
results are diametrically opposed to the results observed
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by Weisberg and Kennedy (1969) and virtually all other 
researchers investigating the effects of response- 
independent reinforcement following previous response- 
dependent reinforcement (Davis & Hubbard, 1972; Eldridge et 
al., 1988; Herrnstein, 1966; Neuringer, 1970; Ono, 1987; 
Rescorla & Skucy, 1969; Zeiler, 1968, 1972). Poresky's 
results may best be taken as an indication of the plastic 
nature of behavior and the observation that the effects of 
reinforcement are highly dependent upon subjects' 
characteristics, the particular schedules of reinforcement 
to which they are exposed, and other characteristics of the 
experimental environment.
In the earlier study, Poresky (1969/1970, 1971) 
investigated the effects of response-independent 
reinforcement following a pre-training exercise on female 
adults (16 to 32 years of age) and female children (7 to 14 
years of age). Subjects were told that pushing a button 
might or might not cause a light to appear, and their task 
was to determine if their responses were instrumental in 
causing the light to appear or not. These instructions 
induced an awareness in the subjects that their actions 
might not have an effect on causing the light to appear; 
that is, they were warned in advance that the reward might 
be independent of their button-pressing responses.
Subjects were initially trained on a schedule of response- 
dependent reinforcement. The first 41 button-presses were
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reinforced on an increasing VR 1 to VR 3 schedule. 
Thereafter, subjects were placed on an extinction schedule 
alternating with a VT 3-second schedule of response- 
independent light flashes. These schedules alternated at 
one minute intervals for up to eight minutes. Under these 
conditions, thirty of the adults and five of the children 
reported that they had no control over the light and that 
their responses did not determine the occurrence of the 
reinforcement. From these results, Poresky concluded that 
humans are able to detect noncontingent relationships 
between their actions and environmental rewards, and that 
adults are better at detecting such noncontingencies than 
are children. Further, Poresky observed that rates of 
responding in his subjects were lower under the VT 3-second 
schedule of response-independent reinforcement than they 
were under classic extinction, and from this observation he 
concluded that response-independent reinforcement was more 
effective at suppressing behavior than was classic 
extinction. He ascribed this effect to the fact that 
response-independent reinforcement presents both the 
response and the reinforcement to the subject, so that the 
subject has available more information concerning 
contingent, causal relationships than is available in the 
classic extinction procedure, where the reinforcement 
stimuli are not presented. More information makes it 
easier to discern that the reinforcement schedule has
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changed. One further observation will be of great interest 
for the purposes of the present study: In his doctoral
dissertation, Poresky (1969/1970) hypothesized that 
individuals with an internal locus of control (Rotter,
1966) would be better at detecting noncontingencies than 
would individuals with an external locus of control. He 
reasoned that this might be so based on the assumption that 
internals are better information processors and more 
sensitive to their environment than are externals. This 
hypothesis was not supported; in fact, there was a non­
significant trend for externals to be better than internals 
at detecting response-independent reinforcement. This 
result is in keeping with the major hypothesis of the 
present paper.
In discussing his results, Poresky (1969/1970) points 
out that superstitious behavior is an illustration of an 
inability on the part of organisms to detect a 
noncontingent, non-causal relationship between their 
responses and reinforcing stimuli. Poresky's observation 
that human adults are quite good at detecting 
noncontingencies is at variance with the numerous 
observations that adult humans do, in fact, form 
superstitious behaviors in some circumstances. The 
resolution of this seeming paradox may lie in the design 
parameters of the respective experiments. The instructions 
in Poresky's experiment indicated to subjects that their
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responses might not have an effect on their ability to 
obtain rewards. As a consequence, some of his subjects 
were in fact able to determine that their responses were 
ineffective in causing the light to appear. On the other 
hand, some of his subjects continued to behave as if their 
button-pressing responses were instrumental in causing the 
light to appear. In terms of an interpretation more in 
line with traditional research on superstitions, it might 
be said that these subjects displayed superstitious 
behaviors when exposed to a response-independent schedule 
of reinforcement. The two interpretations are not mutually 
exclusive. It can be observed that in almost any 
experiment of this type, some of the subjects are able to 
discriminate response-independent from response-dependent 
reinforcement and do not develop (or maintain) 
superstitious behaviors under response-independent 
schedules, while others are not able to make such 
discriminations and as a consequence do develop 
superstitious behaviors. The respective phenomena, 
contingency detection and superstitious behavior, are two 
sides of the same coin. Researchers may be able to produce 
whichever effect they desire by the proper specification of 
experimental design parameters. This consideration may 
also apply to Poresky's observation that rates of 
responding were suppressed more under response-independent 
reinforcement than under classic extinction. This result,
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contrary to so many other observations (Davis & Hubbard, 
1972; Eldridge et al., 1988; Herrnstein, 1966; Neuringer, 
1970; Ono, 1987; Rescorla & Skucy, 1969; Weisberg &
Kennedy, 1969; Zeiler, 1968, 1972), may be a consequence of 
the experimental design used by Poresky. His instructions 
introducing the task to his subjects indicated that there 
might not be a relationship between their responses and the 
rewards they received. In other words, they were alerted 
in advance of the possible noncontingent nature of the 
reinforcement schedule.
Leeming, Blackwood, and Robinson (1978) believe that 
learning is hampered by response-independent reward. They 
presented both response-dependent and response-independent 
reward to subjects in an experimental group, while a 
control group received only response-dependent 
reinforcement. Reinforcement was provided on one of ten 
buttons on an experimental console. Subjects were 
instructed to obtain as many points on a counter as they 
could by manipulating the buttons. Subjects given both 
response-dependent and response-independent reinforcement 
produced fewer responses on the reinforced button and also 
fewer over-all responses than subjects who received only 
response-dependent reward. Leeming et al. concluded from 
these observations that their subjects gradually learned 
that the rewards were independent of their responses, and 
this, in turn, reduced both the effect of the contingent
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rewards and also incentive. The learned independence of 
rewards and responses is not the only explanation for this 
phenomenon. As noted by Leeming et al. (1978), "the 
possibility of superstitious learning cannot be ruled out" 
(p. 272) . Incidental pairing of rewards and responses 
could have inadvertently strengthened responses other than 
the ones which were actually instrumental in securing the 
reinforcement.
The studies of Poresky (1969/1970, 1971, 1975) and 
Leeming et al. (1978) should be viewed in a wider context 
of controversy over the essential nature of reinforcement, 
and whether or not human beings are able to discriminate 
between response-dependent and response-independent 
reinforcement, or detect causal, contingent relationships.
A long history of research indicates that humans are not 
very good at detecting causal relationships. Smedslund 
(1963) studied the concept of correlation in adults, and 
found that adults with no training in statistics do not 
have an adequate grasp of the concept. They tend to judge 
the amount of correlation between two events based on the 
number of instances where both events occur in conjunction 
with one another, and ignore cases where one event occurs 
in the absence of the other. In other words, people tend 
to ignore disconfirming cases in making judgments about the 
degree of correlation between events. In this context, 
Singer and Benassi (1981) note that when people make
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judgments about probabilistic data, they "behave as if they 
do not possess the concept of probability, basing their 
estimates on a simple enumeration of positive instances 
rather than on the ratio of positive to negative instances" 
(p. 51). Singer and Benassi also point out that when 
people are asked to identify patterns or correlations in a 
set of data, they show strong tendencies to perceive order 
and causality in random arrays where order and causality do 
not exist. Singer and Benassi attribute this phenomenon to 
a failure to generate alternate hypotheses to explain the 
data and a failure to search for disconfirming data.
Working with response-independent schedules of 
reinforcement, Wright (1962) concluded that superstitious 
response preferences and patterns are established as a 
function of the probability of reward, and that the overall 
density of reward is responsible for reinforcing 
superstitious behaviors. His subjects were poor at 
determining contingent, causal relationships. Higher 
levels of reward resulted in greater levels of 
superstitious behavior and poorer judgments about the 
contingent relationship between responses and outcomes. 
Thus, Wright's subjects' judgments about contingencies were 
based on how successful they perceived themselves to be at 
the experimental task based on the number of points they 
earned, and not on any causal relationship between their 
responses and the rewards they received.
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Jenkins and Ward (1965) asked subjects to make 
judgments about the degree of contingency between responses 
and outcomes, where the degree of contingency varied 
between zero (independent events) and a value well short of 
one (a determinate or completely dependent relation). They 
found that "the amount of judged control was a function of 
the frequency of successful outcomes rather than of the 
actual dependency of outcomes upon responses" (Jenkins & 
Ward, 1965, p. 14). In other words, subjects based their 
judgment of the contingency between outcomes and responses 
upon how often the two occurred together, and not on any 
causal relationship between the two. This result was 
obtained whether the subject was a participant or an 
observer. Jenkins and Ward (1965) note that "subjects are 
surprisingly insensitive to the distinction between 
contingent and noncontingent arrangements. They tend to 
behave as though outcomes depend on responses... when the 
events are in fact independent" (p. 4). In the case of 
superstitious behaviors, where a particular response might 
accidentally be reinforced early in a learning period, "the 
predominance of one response (or pattern of responses) 
together with one outcome will yield an excess of 
confirming over nonconfirming cases which, in turn, might 
lead to a spurious belief in control" (Jenkins & Ward,
1965, p. 4) and a strengthening of the superstitious 
behavior. Jenkins and Ward conclude by suggesting that
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erroneous beliefs concerning control may be traced to the 
absence of a statistical concept of contingency in 
untutored subjects. Such an inability to detect 
contingencies (within defined environmental parameters) is 
at the root of learned superstitious behavior.
The studies reviewed above suggest that human beings 
are not very good at judging causal relationships, and that 
they tend to believe that their actions are more effective 
at securing reinforcements from the environment than is 
actually the case. Langer (1975) addresses questions 
concerning this illusion of control in human beings. She 
defines an illusion of control as "an expectancy of a 
personal success probability inappropriately higher than 
the objective probability would warrant" (Langer, 1975, p. 
313). She believes that skill-related factors may be 
responsible for inducing an illusion of control. "The more 
similar a chance situation is to a skill situation, the 
more likely it is that people approach the chance situation 
with a skill orientation" (Langer, 1975, p. 323). In other 
words, if individuals are confronted with a situation in 
which chance forces are operating (that is to say, there 
are non-causal or noncontingent relationships between 
actions and outcomes), they are likely to believe that they 
do have some control over the situation to the same degree 
that the situation resembles one where skill-related 
factors are effective in controlling or influencing
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outcomes. Skill and chance factors are often so closely 
associated in people's experience that it is difficult to 
discriminate between the two, for "there is an element of 
chance in every skill situation and an element of skill in 
almost every chance situation" (Langer, 1975, p. 324) . For 
example, Benassi, Sweeney, and Drevno (1979) conducted a 
series of experiments on individuals' perceptions of 
success on a psychokinesis task (mentally influencing dice 
to display a specific number when thrown). They found that 
their subjects' estimates of success were independent of 
their actual performance. Subjects who were actively 
involved in throwing the dice (as opposed to observing 
another person throwing them and trying to influence how 
the dice landed) were more likely to believe that they were 
successful in influencing the number the dice displayed. 
Subjects who actively threw the dice (an opportunity to 
exercise a skill-related manipulation) believed they had 
more control over them, despite the fact that none of the 
subjects demonstrated an ability greater than chance in 
causing particular numbers to come up. When they were 
actively involved in throwing them, individuals with an 
internal locus of control were more likely than those with 
an external locus of control to believe that they had been 
successful in manipulating the dice. This result is to be 
expected from social learning theory (Rotter, 1954, 1966, 
1975), as internals are more likely to believe that they
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are responsible for the reinforcements they receive from 
the environment and that rewards are contingent on their 
own behavior. (The relationship between locus of control 
and illusions of control will also be addressed later in 
this paper.)
Langer (1975) believes that the illusion of control 
occurs because individuals are motivated to control their 
environment, and complete mastery of the environment would 
include an ability to beat the odds and control chance 
happenings. Mastery over the environment reduces 
uncertainty, and thus helps to reduce anxiety. A belief in 
control over an impending event (even a nonveridical 
perception of control) helps to reduce the aversiveness of 
that event. Thus, an illusion of control may be viewed as 
the inverse of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975): the
learned dependence between actions and outcomes (in the 
absence of any causal connection) has adaptive value, in 
that it helps reduce the anxiety caused by uncertainty.
One can see an obvious connection between superstitious 
beliefs and the illusion of control. Superstitions can 
give individuals a sense that what is happening to them is 
understandable and explainable, and thus, in a sense, 
predictable. When an event is predictable, the individual 
gains some measure of control over it, and this helps to 
reduce uncertainty and anxiety. This relief from anxiety 
can be a real phenomenon, despite the fact that the
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superstitious belief which gives rise to it is based on an 
illusory control of the situation. In this connection, it 
is interesting to note that Tobacyk (1991) believes that 
"the construction of illusory correlations is a common 
cognitive process characterizing beliefs in superstition" 
(p. 512). (The relationship between personal superstitions 
and the illusion of control will be addressed in the next 
section.)
Three definitive studies by Wasserman and his 
colleagues (Chatlosh, Neunaber, & Wasserman, 1985; 
Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983; Wasserman &
Neunaber, 1986) bear upon the intertwined questions 
revolving around the ability of human beings to detect 
causal relationships, perceived control of the environment, 
and the nature of reinforcement. In the first of these 
studies, Wasserman et al. point out that in the 18th 
century David Hume first expounded the rules by which human 
beings form cause-effect impressions: (1) causes must
precede effects; (2) there must be a close temporal 
contiguity between cause and effect; and (3) there must be 
consistency between causes and effects, that is, they must 
repeatedly occur together, but not singly. Wasserman et 
al. note that much of the learning literature is consistent 
with the first two of Hume's rules, but that there is 
conflicting evidence for the third (some of which has been 
reviewed above). Wasserman and Neunaber point out that
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there are three competing theories concerning the nature of 
reinforcement: (1) at the molar level, increases in the
rate of operant responding bring about increases in the 
rate of reinforcement; (2) at a more molecular level, 
operant responses may be strengthened because they 
immediately precede reinforcers (that is to say, temporal 
contiguity is sufficient for reinforcement to occur, the 
second of Hume's rules); and (3) also at a molecular level, 
the determining factor in the phenomenon of reinforcement 
may be the local conditional or probabilistic relationship 
holding between the occurrence/nonoccurrence of operant 
responding and the presentation/nonpresentation of a 
reinforcer within relatively small periods of time. This 
third point is equivalent to saying that at a molecular 
level there is a causal relationship between responses and 
reinforcers (the third of Hume's rules). Wasserman and 
Neunaber note that traditional interval and ratio schedules 
of reinforcement are ill-suited to discriminating between 
the effects of these three theories, and new techniques and 
schedules of reinforcement are needed to demonstrate their 
relative importance. Teasing out the relative 
contributions of these three factors is the task set by 
Wasserman and his colleagues.
Wasserman et al. (1983) and Chatlosh et al. (1985) 
attempted to devise experiments which would demonstrate the 
abilities of human beings to form unbiased judgments about
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response-outcome correlations, that is, about perceived 
consistencies between causes and effects. They used 
probabilistic reinforcement schedules designed by Hammond 
(1980) to minimize interactions between response rate and 
outcome probability. "Independence of these two variables 
was achieved by programming conditional reinforcement 
probabilities for a 'response' and 'no response' on a 
second-by-second basis" (Chatlosh et al., 1985, p. 2) .
These schedules determine whether or not to deliver a 
reinforcer every t seconds, depending upon whether or not a 
response has occurred within the last t seconds. That is, 
within a given time frame, the probability of reward given 
a response can be varied independently of the probability 
of reward given no response. Thus, the probabilistic 
schedule can be seen as two independent schedules combined 
into one. One schedule reinforces the subject for 
responding, another for not responding, and the 
reinforcement rates of the schedules can be adjusted so 
that the overall reinforcement rate for either responding 
or not responding is higher. If the combined probability 
of reinforcement is greater than zero, the conditional 
relationship between responses and rewards is positive, and 
excitatory conditioning should result. If the combined 
probability of reinforcement is less than zero, the 
conditional relationship is negative, and inhibitory 
conditioning should result. If the combined probability of
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reinforcement is exactly zero, there is no conditional 
relationship between responses and rewards, and behavior 
should be neither strengthened nor weakened. Chatlosh et 
al. argue that by focusing the probability of reward on 
small time intervals, probabilistic reinforcement schedules 
reduce or eliminate the role of temporal contiguity in 
schedule performance. They demonstrated that telegraph 
key-pressing behavior, reinforced by points or monetary 
rewards, can be controlled by probabilistic schedules, and 
that their subjects' judgments of the relationships between 
responses and reinforcers were very close approximations of 
the true probabilistic relationships, whether the 
relationships were positive, negative, or zero. Chatlosh 
et al. view this as strong evidence that temporal 
contiguity is not necessary for the operant reinforcement 
of behavior, and that humans are able to form accurate 
judgments as to causal relationships under certain 
conditions.
Wasserman and Neunaber (1986) directly address the 
second of Hume's rules of human perception of causation, 
regarding the role of temporal contiguity in reinforcement 
and in generating perceptions of causation. They used 
newly devised schedules of reinforcement (Hineline, 1970, 
1977) which determine when to deliver reinforcers, but do 
not affect the overall rate of reinforcement or determine 
whether or not the organism is reinforced. As stated in
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Wasserman and Neunaber (1986):
By design, these schedules can guarantee 
that changes in the rate of operant responding 
will not entail any corresponding changes in the 
rate of reinforcement, thereby eliminating the 
involvement of molar response-reinforcer 
correlation in schedule performance.
Furthermore, depending upon the time interval 
used for calculation, these schedules may also 
question the behavioral relevance of the local 
conditional relationship between response and 
reinforcer. (p. 16)
These schedules permitted subjects to 
advance or to delay appetitive or aversive 
events, without also affecting (a) the 
probability of the events occurring within a 
brief time interval or (b) the correlation 
between response rate and reinforcement rate over 
more extended periods of time. (p. 17)
Thus, merely by advancing or delaying the presentation of 
the reinforcing stimuli, these schedules can minimize or 
eliminate the effects of molar response rates and local 
conditional probabilities in reinforcing behavior. The 
only effect left is that of temporal contiguity between 
responses and rewards. Working with rats, Hineline (1977) 
demonstrated that when lever-pressing was reinforced by 
shock delay, responding was maintained even when lever- 
pressing also increased the number of shocks received, 
relative to the base-line condition. Such is the strength 
of the effect of temporal contiguity. Wasserman and 
Neunaber demonstrated similar effects with human subjects 
in an experiment using key-tapping as the operant behavior, 
using both appetitive and aversive stimuli (point gain and 
point loss). They found that
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Schedules whose sole consequence was moving 
the time of an inevitable outcome were effective 
in modifying subjects' key tapping as well as in 
influencing their later ratings of the prevailing 
response-outcome contingencies....
When it advanced the time of an appetitive 
outcome, key tapping was reinforced and subjects 
gave positive [response-reinforcer contingency] 
ratings ("tapping caused the light to occur").
These results held whether outcome advance was 
accompanied by strict response-reinforcer 
contiguity... or not.... When key tapping 
advanced the time of an aversive outcome, 
subjects also gave positive ratings; here, 
however, key tapping was punished by outcome 
advance.... When it delayed the time of an 
aversive outcome, key tapping was reinforced and 
subjects gave negative ratings ("tapping 
prevented the light from occurring"...). When 
key tapping delayed the time of an appetitive 
outcome, subjects also gave negative ratings; 
here, however, key tapping was punished by 
outcome delay. (Wasserman & Neunaber, 1986, 
p. 30)
Thus, subjects' responses on the telegraph keys could 
postpone or advance (but not produce or prevent) gains or 
losses of points. Nevertheless, the schedules were able to 
influence the subjects' key-tapping behavior and also 
influence their judgments of causal relationships.
Wasserman and Neunaber hold that these results are strong 
arguments that temporal contiguity is an important factor 
in the operant reinforcement of behavior in human beings. 
Combined with the earlier results of Wasserman et al.
(1983) and Chatlosh et al. (1985), both temporal contiguity 
and the existence of causal, contingent relationships (in 
the form of local conditional probabilities) can be 
demonstrated to be effective, alone or in combination, in
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controlling behavior. They each appear to be independent 
contributors to operant Conditioning and judgments of 
causal relationships. (Wasserman and Neunaber, 198 6, 
believe that the evidence for the role of molar response- 
reinforcer correlation is weak.) In discussing these 
results, Wasserman and Neunaber note that contingent or 
causal relations are abstract in nature, and that the 
notion of causation is a psychological phenomenon. They 
argue that what is important in human behavior is a 
perception of causality. The temporal pairing of responses 
and reinforcing stimuli is sufficient to create such a 
perception, and the perception, in turn, is sufficient to 
reinforce behavior. Wasserman et al. point out that the 
history of the disagreement over the respective roles of 
contingency and contiguity in reinforcement has been a 
history of attempts to incorporate one phenomenon into the 
other. Incorporating both phenomena into a single 
mechanism would be a more parsimonious explanation than 
considering each to be independent contributors to 
reinforcement, but such attempts cannot be resolved at the 
present time. For now at least, it appears that 
contingency and contiguity are "independent contributors to 
the psychology of causation" (Wasserman et al., 1983, p.
431) .
Taken in their entirety, the studies by Wasserman and 
his colleagues (Chatlosh, Neunaber, & Wasserman, 1985;
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Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983; Wasserman &
Neunaber, 1986) demonstrate that (1) temporal contiguity is 
sufficient for reinforcement to occur, and that (2) human 
beings can make accurate judgments about response-outcome 
correlations (or contingencies) under the proper 
circumstances. Response acquisition is exquisitely 
sensitive to the molecular topography of the reinforcement 
schedule and to the experimental setting. For this reason, 
differing procedures can produce different results. 
Regarding their conclusion that humans are capable of 
making accurate judgments about causality, Wasserman et al. 
and Chatlosh et al. explain the discrepancy between their 
results and previous studies by pointing out differences in 
the procedures used to investigate judgments of 
contingencies: (1) The type of response alternatives
utilized (whether to respond or not respond, as opposed to 
choosing between two alternative choices) can affect 
subjects' abilities to make accurate discriminations. The 
use of a single response alternative, which subjects can 
make or not make, as they choose, results in more accurate 
judgments of contingent relationships. (2) If both 
positive and negative contingencies are included in an 
experimental situation, instructing subjects to rate only 
the magnitude of their control over the situation may 
mislead them into making erroneous judgments. In such a 
situation, asking them to rate both the magnitude and the
Locus of Control and Superstition
61
direction of a relationship may result in more accurate 
judgments on the part of subjects. (3) Finally, Wasserman 
and his colleagues maintain that the free-operant 
techniques of presenting information which they used in 
their studies result in greater sensitivity in detecting 
contingencies than do the discrete-trial and continuous- 
trial procedures used by other researchers working in the 
area, although the reasons for this difference are unclear.
Building upon this discussion, Wasserman et al. (1983) 
state "knowing that [artificial] conditions exist under 
which accuracy is high and bias is nil does not tell us 
that humans typically bring such sensitivity to everyday 
causal judgments" (p. 430). Indeed, one might argue that 
the real-life situations in which people find themselves 
are not always clear and easily analyzed, even if people 
were motivated to perform a conscious analysis. Under 
conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty, people might not 
be very good at detecting causal relationships between 
reinforcing stimuli and responses. They might not even 
consciously consider the situation as one in need of 
careful analysis. Consequently, the incidental pairing of 
responses and desired outcomes might easily come to 
influence their behavior (through the mechanism of temporal 
contiguity). Superstitious behavior, behavior in which a 
person acts as if a causal relationship exists between 
their behavior and a desired outcome when in fact no such
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causal relationship exists, could be the result. 
Superstitious behavior would be supported by the common 
motivation to control the environment and to control chance 
happenings, in order to reduce uncertainty and anxiety 
(Langer, 1975) .
In the context of the debate revolving around the 
nature of reinforcement and whether or not humans are good 
contingency detectors, many researchers (Chatlosh et al., 
1985; Justice & Looney, 1990; Weisberg & Kennedy, 1969) 
point out that it is best to phrase any discussion of these 
problems in terms of the temporal parameters which define 
the schedules of reinforcement in use, the population 
characteristics representative of the subjects utilized, 
and the environmental circumstances in which the effects 
are observed. Researchers can obtain a variety of 
differing effects by paying proper attention to these three 
factors. Experiments can be devised where people are adept 
at detecting the causal relationships between responses and 
reinforcers, and consequently do not form superstitions. 
Conversely, experiments in which the learning situations 
are uncertain, ambiguous, or unclear can also be devised. 
These experiments may result in superstitious behaviors.
The more closely such experiments duplicate the capricious 
conditions of the real-life environments in which human 
beings live, the better analogs they are of situations in 
which people are likely to learn superstitious behaviors.
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More recent studies indeed have demonstrated the 
learning of superstitious behavior as a result of response- 
independent reinforcement, both in children (Wagner & 
Morris, 1987) and in adults (Ono, 1987; Stegman & 
McReynolds, 1978). These results are generally analyzed in 
terms of Skinner's (1948, 1953, 1977) conceptualization of 
superstitious behavior as a result of reinforcement due to 
temporal contiguity. The effects, however, have generally 
been limited to only a portion of the subjects studied 
(Ono, 1987; Stegman & McReynolds, 1978; Wagner & Morris, 
1987), and the effects have sometimes been unstable, with 
only transient superstitious behavior displayed by some 
subjects (Ono, 1987).
Wagner and Morris (1987) attempted to demonstrate 
acquisition of superstitious behavior through a procedure 
akin to Skinner's work with pigeons, where the 
superstitious responses of the subjects were not 
constrained by the design parameters of the experiment.
They note that prior to their work, this design had not 
been replicated with human subjects. They used children, 
three-and-a-half through six years of age, and reinforced 
them on FT 15-second and FT 3 0-second schedules with 
marbles delivered through the mouth of a child-sized (90 
cm) mechanical clown. Wagner and Morris found that seven 
of the twelve children exposed to response-independent 
reinforcement developed clear superstitious behavior which
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increased in frequency toward the end of each FT interval. 
These behaviors included smiling, grimacing, puckering the 
lips, touching the nose of the clown, touching other parts 
of the clown's face, kissing the clown's nose, and swinging 
the hips. The remaining five children developed behaviors 
which may have been due to incidental reinforcement, but 
which were open to alternative interpretations. Wagner and 
Morris (1987) interpreted their results as "evidence that 
human behavior will emerge and be maintained by 
contingencies similar to those arranged by Skinner (1948) 
in his superstitious conditioning paradigm" (p. 482).
Stegman & McReynolds (1978) were able to inculcate 
superstitious behavior in college students using response- 
independent negative reinforcement. In a pre-training 
exercise, subjects were exposed to a moderately aversive 
(95 decibel) tone in conjunction with a light providing 
feedback as to whether or not the subjects were successful 
in stopping the tone. Three experimental groups were used, 
each differing in the type of pre-training that they 
received: (1) an escapable-feedback group where tone
offset and feedback light onset were contingent upon an FR 
4 button-pressing response; (2) a fully yoked, 
inescapable-feedback group where both tone offset and light 
onset were controlled by another subject in the escapable- 
feedback group, such that the yoked subjects' behavior had 
no effect on tone offset or feedback; and (3) a partially
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yoked, inescapable-no-feedback group in which tone offset 
was determined by a paired subject in the escapable- 
feedback condition but the feedback light was never 
illuminated. Subjects in a control group were not given 
any pre-training. All four groups were then exposed to ten 
test trials in which an aversive tone could be escaped by 
an FR 4 button pressing response. Following this 
manipulation, subjects in the escapable-feedback condition 
received ten extinction trials where the tone was 
inescapable and the feedback light was nonfunctional.
During the test trials, learned helplessness was displayed 
by subjects in the inescapable-no-feedback group. Six of 
ten subjects in the inescapable-feedback group developed 
behaviors which they identified as being instrumental in 
averting the aversive tone, contrary to commonly accepted 
theories of learned helplessness but in keeping with the 
hypotheses of Stegman and McReynolds. They interpreted the 
perceived control and persistent superstitious responding 
displayed by these subjects as resulting from accidental 
contingencies. They further view learned helplessness in 
humans as an extinction effect coupled with a failure to 
detect a change in environmental contingencies. Stegman 
and McReynolds conclude their paper by suggesting that the 
superstitious behavior that they observed is a type of 
learned obsessiveness (behavior which is continued despite 
its ineffectiveness) and is an experimental analog of
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obsessive-compulsive neurosis.
Ono (1987) demonstrated superstitious behavior in 
college students using lever-pulling responses reinforced 
on FT 30, FT 60, VT 30, and VT 60 schedules of 
reinforcement. In a design unusual for superstitious 
conditioning experiments with humans, she presented various 
colored lights to her subjects in conjunction with 
response-independent reward in an attempt to induce sensory 
superstitions (Morse & Skinner, 1957). Three of her twenty 
subjects developed strong, stable superstitious behavior. 
One subject developed stable, stereotyped patterns of 
lever-pulling. A second developed a stylized series of 
behaviors involving touching various objects in the 
experimental room. At one point, the behavior of this 
subject involved jumping in the air and touching the 
ceiling with her slipper. A third subject developed 
behavior reminiscent of sensory superstition seen in 
animals, where responding increased notably during the time 
that a green light was illuminated. Ono noted that 
transient superstitious behaviors appeared in most of her 
other subjects, but that they did not persist to the end of 
the 40 minute experiment. She noted that for the three 
subjects who developed stable superstitious behavior, 
temporal contiguity of responses and reinforcers seemed to 
play a vital role in producing and maintaining the 
behavior. In concluding her paper, Ono suggested that
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chance juxtapositions of human behavior and external events 
may often be responsible for the development of 
superstitious behavior.
The preceding studies all have concerned personal 
superstitions. In an analog study of cultural 
superstitions, Higgins, Morris, and Johnson (1989) were 
able to demonstrate the maintenance of cultural 
superstitions via response-independent reinforcement once 
the superstitions had been induced through other means.
They attempted to instill superstitious beliefs in 
preschoolers by both didactic instruction and modeling 
procedures. Their analog of a cultural superstition was a 
belief that touching the nose of a mechanical clown would 
result in the presentation of marbles, which could then be 
traded for a small toy. Subjects' presses on the nose of 
the clown in no way affected the delivery of marbles. 
Behavior inculcated in the subjects was expected to be 
maintained under response-independent schedules of 
reinforcement. In the didactic instruction condition, 
subjects were told that they could make the clown give them 
marbles by pressing his nose. Two of three subjects in
V
this condition developed stable nose-pressing behavior 
which was maintained under a VT 15-second schedule.
Subjects in a control group, which did not receive 
instructions indicating that touching the hose of the clown 
would result in presentation of the marbles, did not
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develop the nose-pressing behavior in response to the VT 
15-second schedule of reinforcement. In the modeling 
condition, subjects watched a videotape of the clown 
dispensing marbles from its mouth while a child pressed on 
its nose (the videotape was made of a subject interacting 
with the clown during the didactic instruction portion of 
the experiment). Two of five children in the modeling 
condition developed stable nose-pressing behavior which was 
maintained under a VT 15-second schedule. Subjects in a 
control group did not develop stable nose pressing- 
behavior. Higgins et al. regard these results as an 
example of the incidental or adventitious reinforcement of 
imitative behavior. Thus, half of the subjects of Higgins 
et al. maintained superstitious nose-pressing behavior as a 
result of the beliefs instilled in them by didactic 
instruction or peer modeling. Higgins et al. contend that 
responding during the VT schedule can be conceptualized as 
an example of a superstitious behavior that was initially 
engendered through social interaction, and thus is 
analogous to a culturally learned superstition. They 
conclude that superstitious behavior can be socially 
transmitted.
In summary, despite the controversy surrounding the 
question of the nature of reinforcement and questions as to 
whether human beings are able to detect environmental 
contingencies, the experiments reviewed above have
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demonstrated that superstitious behavior can be induced 
and/or maintained in humans by several different incidental 
learning paradigms. What is crucial for the development of 
any given effect is the selection of the correct schedule 
of reinforcement and the provision of the necessary 
environmental circumstances. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that these studies have their difficulties. Many 
(Btuner & Revusky, 1961; Catania & Cutts, 1963; Zeiler,
197 0) have not used a pure response-independent learning 
paradigm, as did Skinner (1948), but observed superstitious 
behavior as a concurrent result of some other (response- 
dependent) schedule of reinforcement. These other 
schedules of reinforcement did control some aspects of 
responding (or not responding), even if they did not 
control the superstitious behaviors themselves. Most other 
studies which have used response-independent reinforcement 
(Higgins, Morris, & Johnson, 1989; Ono, 1987; Stegman & 
McReynolds, 1978; Wagner & Morris, 1987; Wright, 1962) have 
often used instructions or experimental designs which have 
created an intent to learn in their subjects, so that they 
might not truly be said to be incidental learning 
paradigms, since incidental learning is "learning which 
takes place without the intent to learn or in the absence 
of formal instruction" (Walker, 1991, p. 105) . Despite 
these caveats, the significant results reported by numerous 
researchers using numerous different paradigms would seem
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to support the validity of the concept of superstitious 
behavior in humans as a result of response-independent 
reinforcement. The reported beliefs of the subjects 
support the concept as well.
Superstition and Locus of Control
Locus of control of reinforcement (Rotter, 1966, 1975) 
is a construct well known to students of psychology. 
According to Rotter's formulation, people possess 
generalized expectancies as to the causal location of the 
reinforcements they receive from the environment. 
Individuals may expect that reinforcements come to them due 
to forces outside their control, or that reinforcements 
come to them due to their own efforts. The expectancies 
can be arranged on a continuum, from expectancies 
attributed to the internal resources and abilities of the 
individual, through intermediate values, to expectancies 
focused on forces and circumstances external to the 
individual. People who attribute responsibility for events 
in their lives to their own resources, efforts, and 
abilities are said to have an internal locus of control of 
reinforcement. People who attribute such responsibility to 
forces outside of themselves, to fate, luck, chance, 
powerful others, etc., are said to possess an external 
locus of control of reinforcement. These two groups are 
commonly referred to as internals and externals,
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respectively. For reviews of research with the locus of 
control construct, please see Joe (1971), Lefcourt (1966a, 
1966b, 1972, 1981, 1982), Phares (1976), and Ryckman 
(1979) .
Superstitions have been studied with respect to 
individuals' locus of control of reinforcement, but much of 
this research has been conducted in conjunction with 
investigations into occult and paranormal belief systems. 
Several researchers (Belter & Brinkmann, 1981; Randall & 
Desrosiers, 1980; Scheidt, 1973; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) 
have demonstrated varying degrees of positive correlation 
between externality and belief in the existence of 
supernatural and paranormal forces (astrology, fortune 
telling, precognition, etc.). Additionally, these studies 
have generally indicated that females are more likely than 
males to endorse a belief in the paranormal. Tobacyk and 
Milford, however, caution that belief in the paranormal may 
be a multi-dimensional phenomenon. They developed a seven 
factor scale to measure belief in the paranormal, and found 
that each of the subscales measured a different component 
of belief. They obtained differing results for the effects 
of locus of control and of sex on responses for each of the 
seven subscales. Externality was significantly correlated 
with high scores on the full Paranormal Scale and on the 
Extraordinary Life Forms subscale, but not with any of the 
other subscale scores (using the I-E Scale, Rotter, 1966).
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Females scored significantly higher on the Traditional 
Religious Belief and Precognition subscales than did males. 
Males scored significantly higher than females on the 
Extraordinary Life Forms subscale. In addition, externals 
scored higher than internals on the Superstition subscale 
(measuring common cultural superstitions), but this 
difference was not significant.
Working with the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & 
Milford, 1983), Tobacyk, Nagot, and Miller (1988) 
discovered that beliefs in cultural superstitions were 
positively correlated with an external locus of control, as 
measured by both the Personal Efficacy and the 
Interpersonal Control subscales of the Spheres of Control 
(SOC) Scale (Paulhus, 1983). Tobacyk et al. found that the 
relationship between superstition and externality was 
significant for both men and women. Davies and Kirkby 
(1985) also endorse the idea that belief in the paranormal 
is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Working with the 
Paranormal Belief Scale, they reported that superstition 
was correlated with externality on both the Personal 
Efficacy and Sociopolitical subscales of the Paulhus SOC 
Scale. Thus, externality and superstitious beliefs have 
been demonstrated in all spheres of endeavor measured by 
the SOC Scale.
Davies and Kirkby (1985) report a finding contrary to 
the usual observation that externality and belief in the
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paranormal are related to each other. In their study, 
internal control expectancies on the Personal Efficacy and 
Interpersonal Control subscales of the SOC were positively 
correlated with a belief in witchcraft and 
parapsychological phenomena. McGarry and Newberry (1981) 
reported a similar correlation working with the I-E Scale 
(Rotter, 1966). McGarry and Newberry found that increasing 
levels of belief and involvement with ESP phenomena and 
psychic readings were correlated with an internal locus of 
control. They believe that adoption of a paranormal belief 
system may be one method that individuals use to attain 
feelings of competence and perceived mastery over the 
environment.
In addition to the investigations which have 
considered the relationship between locus of control and 
superstition in the context of paranormal belief systems, 
several studies have specifically addressed the 
relationship between locus of control and common cultural 
superstitions. These studies have usually demonstrated a 
positive relationship between superstition and externality. 
Jahoda (1970) reported a positive correlation between 
externality and superstitious belief in Ghanaian university 
students. Plug (1975a) found that externality was 
correlated with belief in a variety of common cultural 
superstitions among white South Africans. Jorgenson (1981) 
discovered that externals are more likely to endorse
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beliefs that their behavior is influenced by the lunar 
cycle. Peterson (1978) found that belief in culturally 
transmitted superstitions directly pertaining to oneself 
(e.g. knocking on wood to avert bad luck) was also 
correlated with externality.
The empirical findings concerning locus of control and 
superstition have generally supported the view that 
externality is correlated with superstition. Superstitious 
beliefs generally reflect an expectancy that fate, luck, or 
chance is influencing the events that impinge upon an 
individual. Self-oriented cultural superstitions are 
concerned with changing one's luck (Peterson, 1978) , and 
may be considered a form of supplication to fate to 
intercede on the part of the individual. Such findings for 
culturally learned superstitions are to be expected from 
social learning theory (Rotter, 1954, 1966). Externals 
tend to believe that fate, luck, or chance control what 
happens to them. The prediction for personally learned 
superstitions is less clear, however. Social learning 
theory might predict that internals would be more prone to 
use personal superstitions, since they are learned from the 
environment and are an attempt to influence the 
environment. An internal might perceive Man association 
between his/her own action and an outside consequence, even 
though the two could not be linked by physical causality" 
(Peterson, 1978, p. 305). In other words, internals would
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tend to profess a belief in their own ability to influence 
external events and reinforcements, regardless of the logic 
of such a belief. Such beliefs would be in accord with 
Langer's (1975) theories regarding the illusion of control. 
As noted earlier, the illusion of control occurs because 
individuals are highly motivated to control their 
environment. Internals are individuals who have come to 
believe, based on past experience, that their actions are 
effective in controlling the reinforcements they receive.
To the extent that such beliefs are at variance with the 
objective probabilities that their actions are actually 
effective in securing reinforcements (that is, to the 
extent that they are deluded into believing that they 
actually have some control over events), internals may be 
said to be utilizing superstitious beliefs. Another way of 
saying this is that a personal superstition is an illusion 
that one possesses a greater efficacy in controlling the 
environment than an objective assessment would warrant. 
According to this line of argument, internals, who are more 
likely to believe that they are responsible for the 
reinforcements they receive from the environment and that 
rewards are contingent on their own behavior, would be more 
likely than externals to fall into this illusion, this 
superstition. Externals, who believe that fate or chance 
occurrences control the events that happen to them, should 
be less likely to believe that their own efforts to control
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the reinforcements they receive would be effective. Thus, 
one might expect that internals will be more likely than 
externals to develop personal superstitious beliefs. On 
the other hand, Rotter's contention that externals are more 
concerned than internals with the role of luck influencing 
their lives suggests that externals would be more likely 
than internals to employ personal superstitions, just as 
they are more likely to employ cultural superstitions. 
Observations about the relationship between internality- 
externality and incidental learning, however, offer 
interesting suggestions to resolve this question.
Locus of Control and Incidental Learning
As noted earlier, incidental learning is learning 
which takes place without an intent to learn. Some authors 
believe that individuals with an internal locus of control 
have cognitive capabilities which make them more likely 
than externals to learn information and behaviors 
incidentally. Several studies have shown that internals 
tend to be more alert and more cognitively active than 
externals. Internals learn rules more quickly and gather 
more information about the situations in which they find 
themselves in attempts to cope with and control outcomes 
(Lefcourt, 1972, 1982).
Internals are more cognitively active. They 
exhibit better learning and acquisition of 
material, they more actively seek information,
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they show a superior utilization of information 
or data once it is acquired, they are more 
attentive, alert, and sensitive than are 
externals, and they seem to be more concerned 
with the informational demands of situations than 
with any presumed social demands....
The superior mastery and coping of internals 
seems to be accomplished through their superior 
cognitive processing activities. They seem to 
acquire more information, make more attempts at 
acquiring it, are better at retaining it, are 
less satisfied with the amount of information 
they possess, are better at utilizing information 
and devising rules to process it, and generally 
pay more attention to relevant cues in the 
situation. (Phares, 1976, p. 78)
In a word association test utilizing sexual double 
entendres, Lefcourt, Gronnerud, and McDonald (1973) found 
that internals demonstrated an awareness of the unusual 
nature of the words earlier in the task than did externals. 
Lefcourt et al. (1973) concluded that this was an 
indication that internals were more cognitively aware than 
externals. Lefcourt (1967) demonstrated that internals 
need less explication of task cues to perform well on 
ambiguous tasks. Lefcourt and Wine (1969) found that 
internals were more likely than externals to search for 
information derived from eye contact when interviewing 
people who were acting in an unusual manner (that is, when 
the people were avoiding eye contact with the interviewer). 
This effect was not seen when the interviewee was not 
acting in an ambiguous manner. Lefcourt and Wine concluded 
that internals were more vigilant when confronted with a 
person exhibiting unusual behavior, observed more
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behaviors, and were more likely to be attentive to 
informational cues which were of possible assistance in 
resolving uncertainty. Davis and Phares (1967) found that 
internals were more likely to actively search for useful 
information when confronted with a task requiring them to 
influence another person's opinion. Phares (1968) 
demonstrated that when the amount of information about 
other people memorized by internals and externals was the 
same, internals were more likely to use efficiently the 
information they had available to make decisions about 
those people. Lefcourt, Lewis, and Silverman (1968) 
demonstrated that internals consider more task-relevant and 
task-irrelevant items in a decision making task and were 
more effective at deploying their attention to solve the 
task successfully. DuCette and Wolk (197 3) have shown that 
internals were better than externals at information 
extraction and utilization in a variety of problem-solving 
tasks. Phares (1976) believes that the tendency of 
externals to learn less than internals is a direct 
consequence of the expectancy that they do not control the 
relationship between behavior and reinforcement. Ryckman 
(1979) believes that internals may be more likely to use 
their cumulative experiences to develop better problem­
solving strategies or more accurate and realistic 
assessments of their capabilities, so that they perform 
better on a variety of tasks.
Locus of Control and Superstition
79
Other characteristics of internals and externals may 
affect their learning ability. Internals are more task- 
oriented and show greater task persistence than externals 
(Ryckman, 1979). Internals are more resistant to subtle 
manipulation than are externals and are harder to 
condition, while externals tend to be more sensitive to and 
compliant with experimenter influences (Lefcourt, 1982; 
Phares, 1976) . These effects have been observed in verbal 
conditioning tasks (Doctor, 1971; Getter, 1966; Strickland, 
1970) and in other tasks as well (Biondo & MacDonald, 1971; 
Cravens & Worchel, 1977) . Internals are more trusting of 
their own judgments than are externals, and are less likely 
to conform to or comply with influences which violate those 
judgments (Crowne & Liverant, 1963). Hiroto (1974) 
demonstrated that externals are more likely to develop 
learned helplessness than internals when exposed to 
inescapable aversive events. He believes that learned 
helplessness and external locus of control of reinforcement 
are similar concepts. Both are expectancies that 
responding and reinforcements are separate, that is to say, 
that one's efforts on one's own behalf are ineffective in 
averting undesirable consequences. Finally, Ude and Vogler 
(1969) discovered that internals were better than externals 
at determining the contingencies of reinforcement in a task 
requiring prediction of patterns of flashing lights.
The examples cited above support the contention that
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relative to externals, individuals with an internal locus 
of control tend to be more sensitive to the relevant 
stimulus characteristics of the situations in which they 
find themselves and are more efficient at gathering and 
utilizing information from the environment. This, in turn, 
is hypothesized to make internals more susceptible than 
externals to the influence of incidental learning 
situations (Kassin & Reber, 1979; Lefcourt, 1972, 1982; 
Phares, 1976; Wolk & DuCette, 1974). However, studies 
designed to investigate the relationship between locus of 
control and incidental learning have produced mixed 
results. Some studies have demonstrated that internals are 
more likely than externals to learn information 
incidentally, but others have not. Most of the 
investigations demonstrating greater incidental learning 
for internals have involved some kind of verbal learning. 
These experiments have considered incidental learning for 
prose passages, geometric designs, and for learning an 
artificial language.
Wolk and DuCette (1974) presented subjects with prose 
material which was to be scanned for typographical errors. 
Incidental learning was measured by the amount of content 
information which was retained. Results indicated that 
internals were better at finding typographical errors (the 
intentional task) and at remembering the content of the 
prose passage (the incidental task). Wolk and DuCette
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interpret their results as supportive of the theory that 
internals are more perceptually sensitive and more 
efficient at extracting and utilizing information.
Contrary results were obtained by Organ (197 6) . On a task 
involving proofreading of prose passages, he demonstrated 
that both externality and anxiety were negatively 
correlated with intentional performance under anxiety 
provoking conditions, but under non-stressful conditions 
there were no significant differences in intentional 
learning between internals and externals. His overall 
pattern of results suggests that there were no significant 
differences in incidental learning between internals and 
externals under either condition. Organ suggests that 
anxiety functions as an intervening variable between locus 
of control and cognitive processes, so that the poorer 
performances of externals may at least partly be explained 
by their greater levels of anxiety.
Brooks and McKelvie (1986) had university students 
read prose passages that had previously been rated to be of 
high, medium, or low relevance to college students.
Subjects in a cued condition were asked to rate the 
passages for relevance and were told that they would be 
tested on the material at a later date. Subjects in an 
uncued condition were told to rate the passages for 
relevance but were not informed that they would be tested 
on the material. Twenty-four hours later, all subjects
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were tested on their retention of the material. Internals, 
as opposed to externals, consistently retained more 
material across all three levels of relevance in both the 
cued and uncued conditions. In discussing their results, 
Brooks and McKelvie point out that the superior performance 
of internals over externals in the uncued condition can be 
interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that internals are 
more likely to learn information incidentally. These 
results (and the experimental design) are similar to 
earlier findings of Seeman (1963) that prison inmates low 
in alienation (an internal locus of control) were more 
likely to learn incidentally and to remember information of 
high relevance (information pertaining to parole) then were 
prisoners high in alienation (an external locus of 
control).
Beaule and McKelvie (1986) replicated the study of 
Brooks and McKelvie (1986) using more uncued conditions in 
an attempt to demonstrate differential effects for the 
relevance of the passages read. However, Beaule and 
McKelvie failed to find any significant differences in 
memory for passages between internals and externals in any 
of the conditions. They point out that their failure to 
find differences may have resulted from the cover task they 
used. Rating passages for relevance involves a deep 
cognitive processing task, that is, it requires that 
subjects comprehend the material in order to perform the
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task. The proofreading tasks used by Wolk and DuCette 
(1974) only required a shallow degree of processing for 
task performance. Comprehension of the material was not 
required. Beaule and McKelvie suggest that differential 
effects of locus of control may only manifest themselves in 
conditions where information is subjected to shallow 
processing, and not in those situations which require deep 
processing.
Kassin and Reber (1979) related the locus of control 
to the learning of a complex artificial language. Subjects 
were asked to scan and memorize a series of examples of a 
synthetic language (the intentional task). However, 
success in learning the language was dependent on subjects 
deducing the abstract grammatical structure of the language 
from the examples (the incidental task). Kassin and Reber 
found that internals were more effective than externals in 
discriminating the underlying grammar of the language.
They interpreted this result as supportive of the 
observation that internals are more likely than externals 
to learn information incidentally, and that internals 
utilized that information more effectively.
In a study performed in 1973, Dixon (1977) 
investigated the tunneling effect in respect to locus of 
control. The funneling effect is a term used to describe 
the observation that intentional learning increases and 
incidental learning decreases on a task as an individual's
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level of motivation increases. Dixon hypothesized that 
externals would show a funneling effect, but that internals 
would display consistent high levels of learning under both 
high and low levels of motivation. He asked subjects to 
memorize a serial list of twelve geometric forms (six 
different forms, such as a square, triangle, etc., each 
appearing twice in the sequence). This was the intentional 
task. Each geometric form was associated with two of six 
different colors. The incidental learning task was a 
recognition test relating the forms with their respective 
colors. Dixon found that an individual's locus of control 
was not correlated with their performance on either the 
intentional or the incidental learning task. Dixon and 
Cameron (1976) replicated the earlier work of Dixon (1977) 
and extended it by considering additional personality 
variables. They also failed to find a correlation between 
intentional or incidental learning and locus of control.
The characteristics of internals reviewed earlier, the 
facts that they are more cognitively active, better at 
information extraction and utilization, more task-oriented 
and persistent, etc., all may contribute to the supposition 
that internals tend to be more sensitive to the effects of 
incidental learning than are externals. Of course, such a 
conclusion is tentative, given the contradictory results of 
the studies reviewed above. However, since some personal 
superstitions are learned incidentally, and people with an
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internal locus of control may be more susceptible to the 
influence of incidental learning, it seems possible that 
people with a high degree of internality would be more 
susceptible to the learning of personal superstitions than 
would those with a high degree of externality.
Locus of control and Learned Personal Superstitions
Given that individuals with an internal locus of 
control have a higher level of belief in their own ability 
to control reinforcements than do people with an external 
locus of control, internals should display higher levels of 
such a belief (and concomitant behaviors) in most learning 
situations. Since internals are more cognitively active 
and tend to believe that they are in control of the 
reinforcements that they receive from the environment, it 
is believed that they will be more likely to attempt to 
manipulate the environment in order to obtain the desired 
reinforcements, and to believe that they have been 
successful in such attempts. In addition, since they also 
seem to be more prone than externals to learn behaviors and 
beliefs incidentally, and since at least some personal 
superstitions appear to be learned incidentally, people 
with a high degree of internality should be more prone to 
learn personal superstitious beliefs and behaviors when 
exposed to an incidental learning situation. People with a 
high degree of externality should show fewer effects from
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incidental learning. When placed in a superstitious 
conditioning experiment where behavior is reinforced on a 
response-independent schedule, internals should be more 
likely to actively explore the experimental environment. 
Through this exploration, they should come to associate 
their actions with whatever rewards they are able to secure 
from the environment, and thus come to develop
superstitious beliefs and behaviors. Externals, on the
other hand, should be more likely to relax and passively 
let the experiment unfold of its own accord. Thus, 
externals should be more likely to discover the response- 
independent nature of the schedule of reinforcement. This 
statement is equivalent to saying that externals will be 
more likely than internals to detect the fact that a 
noncontingent relationship exists between responses and 
rewards. As mentioned earlier, this is exactly the effect 
observed by Poresky (1969/1970) in his study on
noncontingency detection, although the effect in that study
was not significant.
In this connection, one should note that Lefcourt 
(1982) states that individuals with an internal locus of 
control should readily perceive contingencies between their 
actions and outcomes, presumably even if the contingencies 
are spurious. Externals, on the other hand, should tend to 
perceive no contingency between their actions and 
environmental outcomes.
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A greater propensity to develop personal superstitions 
on the part of internals may have adaptive significance. 
Since superstitions are believed to help in controlling 
anxiety, personal superstitions used by internals should 
serve to reduce their levels of anxiety. Internals should 
be better at learning a strategy or belief which is 
effective in reducing anxiety, making them less anxious 
than externals. As noted above, of course, internals tend 
to be less anxious than externals in general.. The use of 
learned personal superstitions may be one of the factors 
behind the lower observed anxiety of internals.
As in many other adaptive behaviors, however, overuse 
of a coping strategy as outlined above might become 
counter-productive. If it is true that internals are more 
prone^than externals to the learning of personal 
superstitions in the manner hypothesized, it is possible 
that internals might be more prone to learn pathological 
behaviors incidentally as well. Thus, a demonstration that 
internals are more likely than externals to learn personal 
superstitions might have important implications for our 
understanding of the etiology (and possibly the treatment) 
of some maladaptive behaviors and certain types of 
psychopathology, such as agoraphobia, obsessive compulsive 
disorder, and other anxiety disorders. For example, Thyer 
(1986) believes that the polyphobic behavior and antipanic 
rituals associated with agoraphobia may be at least
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partially the result of superstitious conditioning. He 
states:
Superstitious conditioning may occur during 
the interval between the onset of panic and its 
remission. If during that time, the individual 
flees the situation associated with the onset of 
panic, avoidance behavior or any other activity 
which the individual engages in may be strongly 
negatively reinforced through the association of 
flight with panic relief. Remission of panic, 
however, is not contingent upon avoidance; the 
individual will obtain relief in a few minutes in 
most cases regardless of what they do....
Avoidance behavior is particularly 
susceptible to such a process of negative 
reinforcement since, if the panic occurs in a 
public place, the panic-stricken individual is 
inclined to leave to avoid social embarrassment.
(Thyer, 1986, p. 98)
In this context, it should be noted that avoidance behavior
is especially hard to extinguish (Ferster, Culbertson, &
Boren, 197 5), and it can be established in humans with a
single adventitious reinforcement (Ferster & De Myer,
1961). If in fact agoraphobic behavior is superstitiously
learned, as Thyer believes, and if internals are more
likely than externals to learn superstitious behaviors,
then internals may be more likely than externals to develop
agoraphobia. Such an idea is highly speculative, of course
(not to mention controversial), since numerous studies have
linked externality with agoraphobia (Hoehn-Saric & McLeod,
1985; Van der Molen, Van den Hout, & Halfens, 1988) .
However, it may be possible that while an internal locus of
control might be a factor in the learning of agoraphobic
behavior, one's locus of control could shift in a more
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external direction after one became afflicted with the 
disorder. A study into this possible relationship would be 
most fascinating.
An interesting study performed by Van Raalte, Brewer, 
Nemeroff, and Linder (1991) addresses the issue raised 
above concerning the hypothesized tendency of internals to 
be more susceptible to the learning of personal 
superstitions. Van Raalte et al. believe that athletes who 
are highly involved in their sport would be susceptible to 
the learning of personal superstitions as a means of coping 
with anxiety. They devised a laboratory experiment using a 
golf putting green in which the situational and personality 
factors in sport-related superstitions could be explored 
under controlled conditions. Van Raalte et al. utilized 
this particular paradigm because (a) it is a valid task for 
investigating sport-related superstitions, (b) putting 
involves a high degree of uncertainty, and (c) putting 
lends itself to a particular form of superstition which is 
easily measured: the use of a "lucky ball." In addition, 
the use of a lucky ball is a behavior that is not 
explainable as an aid to concentration or as a motor 
priming sequence designed to improve physical performance. 
In their experiment, subjects were asked to make 50 putts 
on an indoor putting green, 3.5 meters from the hole. 
Subjects were free to choose from a selection of four 
different colored balls for each putt. Superstitious
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behavior was defined as a tendency to use the same colored 
ball on any given putting attempt after having successfully 
made a putt on the previous attempt using that color ball. 
Subjects were seen as attempting to capture the luck 
inherent in any given ball by using it again after having 
made a putt with it.
Van Raalte et al. (1991) expected that personal sport- 
related superstitions would be most likely to develop in 
situations where performance outcomes were uncertain among 
athletes who had high levels of ego-involvement and 
internal orientations. They classified subjects into 
internals and externals based on their responses to the 
Chance subscale of the Levenson Locus of Control Scales 
(Levenson, 1972, 1981). Subjects scoring high on the 
Chance subscale were classified as externals, while those 
scoring low on the subscale were classified as internals. 
Van Raalte et al. found that internals were significantly 
more likely than externals to use a lucky ball in their 
putting paradigm. The correlation coefficient between use 
of a lucky ball and the Chance subscale was r = -.30 
(p = .035). Van Raalte et al. did not find a significant 
relationship between gender and superstitious behavior.
The results obtained by Van Raalte et al. (1991) are 
strong evidence that individuals with an internal locus of 
control are more likely to learn a personal superstition 
than are individuals with an external locus of control. In
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addition, it should be noted that the procedure used by Van 
Raalte et al. was a true incidental learning paradigm. As 
outlined previously, the analog experimental designs 
traditionally used to investigate the learning of 
superstitious behavior in humans are not true incidental 
learning situations, since the instructions generally 
indicate that the subject is to determine (or learn) how to 
receive reinforcements within the experimental environment. 
The instructions are generally couched in terms of learning 
to solve a problem. True incidental.-learning- occurs—in- the—  
absence of an intent to learn y/^The strength of the 
experiment by Van Raalte et al. is that they were able to 
engender superstitious behavior in their subjects without 
suggesting to them that there was a behavior to be learned 
within the golf putting task. They avoided this problem by 
using a situation in which subjects were to demonstrate a 
skill, putting, without introducing an intent to learn any 
new behaviors or skills. The superstitious response which 
developed, the use of a lucky ball, was truly independent 
of the reinforcement received, success at sinking putts.
Thus, the incidental learning paradigm used by Van Raalte 
et al. is not as vulnerable to some of the criticisms which 
have been leveled at the traditional paradigms used in 
studies of superstitions with humans, and may be considered 
the stronger procedure.
The purpose of the present experiment is to replicate
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and extend the findings of Van Raalte, et al. (1991) by 
using a more traditional method of inculcating 
superstitions in human beings, and to investigate the 
effects of extinction upon learned personal superstitious 
behavior. Parallel significant experimental results 
between the present study and the golf putting paradigm of 
Van Raalte et al. would accomplish two important goals: 
First, it would furnish further support for the theory that 
personal superstitions are learned incidentally, and for 
the hypothesis that internals are more likely than 
externals to learn personal superstitions. Second, it 
would also help to validate both experimental paradigms as 
legitimate methods of investigating the learning of 
personal superstitions. Validation of the more traditional 
analog problem-solving design for inducing superstitious 
behaviors in humans would be especially gratifying, given 
the previously outlined criticisms of such procedures and 
the controversies regarding the essential nature of 
reinforcement. Significant results would also serve to 
enhance our knowledge of the effects of response- 
independent reinforcement on human beings and how it is 
affected by locus of control.
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Hypotheses
Specific hypotheses for the present experiment are as 
follows: Given an incidental learning situation where
subjects are furnished response-independent reinforcement 
for keypresses on a micro-computer keyboard:
1) Internals will be more likely than externals 
to report a superstitious belief that the 
stereotyped patterns of keypresses that they
 developed-were-responsible-for -their obtaining-------
reinforcement from the computer.
2) Internals will be more likely than externals 
to develop stable, stereotyped patterns of 
keypresses on the computer keyboard 
(superstitious behavior).
3) The superstitious response patterns of 
internals will be longer than those of externals.
4) The superstitious response patterns of 
internals will be more complex than those of 
externals.
5) Externals will take longer periods of time to 
develop superstitious patterns of responses than 
will internals.
6) The superstitious response patterns of 
internals will be more resistant to extinction 
than those of externals.
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7) Internals should display lower levels of 
anxiety than externals. (The superstitious 
behaviors that internals develop to help them 
earn points in the computer game should help 
reduce any anxiety that might result from the 
experimental procedure.)
8) Internals will be more likely than externals 
to develop superstitious behaviors in the absence 
of superstitious beliefs, since internals are
more likely to be motivated_to— act_upon_their________
environment in an attempt to control it. (Even 
though they may know at an intellectual level 
that their keypresses will have no effect on the 
reinforcements they receive, internals should 
continue to attempt to manipulate the computer in 
an attempt to control their environment. Actions 
do not always follow stated beliefs. At a non­
intellectual level, internals are hypothesized to 
continue to believe that they can control the 
outcome of the experiment, to continue to be 
motivated to control their environment. Such 
actions should help to alleviate anxiety, because 
they are able to do something. Such activity 
helps to create at least the illusion that they 
are able to do something to control their fate, 
and this in turn helps to reduce anxiety.)
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Methods
Subjects: Subjects were 68 undergraduate students
from the University of Montana human subject pool: 12 male
internals, 17 male externals, 22 female internals, and 17 
female externals. Two hundred eighty three potential 
subjects were screened early in the Spring quarter, 1992, 
using Levenson's (1972, 1981) three-part Locus of Control 
Scale.
Levenson' s (19IT, 198T)~~Locus of—Cont rol~Seare~was 
used to classify subjects because of its demonstrated 
validity and reliability. Rotter's (1966) I-E Scale, 
originally believed to be a unidimensional scale measuring 
a bipolar factor, has been demonstrated to be 
multidimensional, with anywhere from two factors 
(Abramowitz, 1973; Joe & Jahn, 1973; Mirels, 1970; Reid & 
Ware, 1973) to four factors (Collins, 1974). Collins 
determined that individuals could score externally on the 
I-E Scale because they believe that (a) the world is 
difficult, (b) the world is unjust, (c) the world is 
governed by luck, or (d) the world is politically 
unresponsive. Two-factor solutions seem to favor one 
factor loading on an individual's tendency to assign 
greater or lesser importance to ability and hard work as 
opposed to luck as influences on outcomes, and a second 
factor loading on an individual's acceptance or rejection
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of the notion that they can exert some measure of political 
control over events (Abramowitz, 197 3; Joe & Jahn, 1973; 
Mirels, 1970).
Other problems exist with Rotter's (1966) I-E Scale. 
Hjelle (1971) suggests that the I-E Scale may be 
contaminated by social desirability and as a consequence 
its validity may be questionable. Lamont and Brooks (197 3) 
suggest that the I-E Scale is contaminated by a response 
bias related to mood level. They found that for subjects 
-who had -a -change —in--mood- over" a- six~week -period, I-E scores 
correlated -.51 with the change in mood, accounting for 
about 2 5% of the variance in the I-E scores. Some authors 
(Hersch & Scheibe, 1967; Klockars & Varnum, 1975) suggest 
that not only is the I-E Scale multidimensional, but the 
concept of locus of control of reinforcement itself is 
multidimensional as well. Hersch and Scheibe note that 
most of the heterogeneity is accounted for in the concept 
of externality, and suggest that this reflects a diversity 
in the psychological meaning of externality. In this 
context, Gregory (1978) noted that locus of control for 
positive events (attainment of a positive reinforcer) and 
for negative events (escape or avoidance of an aversive 
event) can be independent of one another. He found that 
the Rotter I-E Scale was better at predicting locus of 
control for negative events. Similarly, Levine and Uleman 
(1979) demonstrated that the I-E Scale is better at
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predicting attributions to unsuccessful outcomes than it is 
to successful outcomes.
Building on the concept of multidimensionality within 
the locus of control construct, Levenson (1972, 1981) 
developed a new scale with three independent subscales.
The Powerful Others and Chance subscales are designed to 
differentiate between two types of externals: those who
believe the world is ordered and predictable but that 
powerful others are in control, and those who believe that 
—the world is basically unordered and random. The Internal 
subscale measures the degree to which people believe that 
they are in control of the reinforcements that they receive 
from the environment. Theoretically, an individual could 
score high on all three scales, or low on all three scales, 
or any combination in between. In practice, the Chance and 
Powerful Others scales tend to show modest positive 
correlations with each other, and negative correlations 
with the Internal scale. This pattern of responses is 
consistent with the multidimensional construct of locus of 
control, as measured by the scales (Levenson, 1972, 1981). 
The Levenson scale has been demonstrated to have adequate 
validity and reliability in studies with psychiatric 
patients (Levenson, 1973a), prison inmates (Levenson,
1975), college students (Levenson, 1973b, 1974; Levenson & 
Miller, 1976), and members of the general public (Levenson, 
1974). The Levenson scale was chosen for use on the basis
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of the apparent validity of the Internal and Chance scales 
for the purposes of the present study.
Subjects were classified as either internals or 
externals on the basis of their responses to the Internal 
and Chance scales by means of the following criteria:
Those individuals scoring in the top third of the Internal 
scale and the bottom third of the Chance scale were 
classified as internals. Those scoring in the top third of 
the Chance scale and the bottom third of the Internal scale
we re class ified_ a s e  xt ernals--Cutting—points—were---------
determined by reference to representative national norms, 
as described below. Subjects classified as internals and 
externals were contacted by telephone and asked to take 
part in the experiment.
As national normative data for Levenson's Locus of 
Control Scale does not currently exist, artificial norms 
were calculated based on a representative sample of studies 
cited in Levenson (1981). Data from six separate studies 
utilizing a total of 762 adults and undergraduate college 
students as subjects were averaged. The results are 
presented in Table 1, along with normative data for the 
University of Montana subjects. As can readily be seen, 
the male subjects at the University of Montana were 
significantly less internal and significantly more chance 
oriented than were males in the national sample. This 
disparity created difficulty in procuring sufficient male
Locus of Control and Superstition
99
Table 1. Mean Scores fand Standard Deviations) on the 
Internal and Chance Subscales of the Levenson Locus of 
Control Scale.
Internal Chance
Scale Scale n
National Sample: Males 36.6 (6.4) 15.7 (8.5) 333
Females 35.0 (7.1) 16.1 (8.5) 429
University of Montana
Mai
Females 35.0 (6.4) 16.8 (8.5) 148
Sample: les 34.1 (7.1)* 17.9 (7.3)* 135
*These values differ from the national sample at or 
beyond the .002 level.
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internals for the present study. Consequently, more 
available female internals were used in the experiment to 
maintain an even balance between internals and externals.
Apparatus: The experimental manipulation occurred in
a small room where individual subjects were isolated from 
distractions and from other people. An IBM XT micro­
computer was programmed to furnish response-independent 
reinforcement to subjects and to record their responses on 
the keyboard (see Appendix 1, Protocol). Reinforcement,
.-displayed.on the computer screen, consisted of points----
earned for playing a "game" on the computer.
Reinforcements were furnished on a VT 5 second schedule 
(ten points per interval), providing that the subject made 
at least one keystroke within any given experimental 
session prior to receiving any reinforcement.
Subsequently, reinforcement was independent of any response 
(or lack of response) the subject made. The experiment 
consisted of five two-minute periods of response- 
independent reinforcement, followed by a four minute 
extinction period in which no reinforcements were 
available. Subjects were able to control the length of the 
rest break between each period. Subjects' keystrokes on 
the keyboard were recorded and later analyzed for stable 
patterns of responding.
Procedures: The same procedure was administered to
all subjects. They were told that the experiment was a
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computer controlled problem solving experiment designed to 
investigate some basic principles in human learning and 
that it was designed to try to determine how many different 
ways people devise to solve a particular problem (see 
Appendix 1, Protocol). Further instructions were 
deliberately vague to avoid the introduction of unnecessary 
expectations in the subjects. The experimental 
manipulation was administered by the microcomputer with the 
subject isolated in the experimental room. After the 
- manipulat ion,— subj ects- were -asked—if—they~had--l-earned—the 
pattern of keystrokes which resulted in earning the maximum 
number of points, and what that pattern was (see Appendix 
2, Exit Interview). Subsequently, they were administered 
measures of several possible confounding variables, and 
finally, debriefed (see Appendix 3, Debriefing).
Response Measures: Superstitious behavior, defined as
relatively stable patterns of keypresses on the computer 
keyboard, was assessed in terms of responses on the 
keyboard: whether or not stable patterns of responses 
developed, the length and complexity of the responses, the 
length of time which passed before development of the 
stable superstitious response, and its resistance to 
extinction. Superstitious belief was assessed by verbal 
report of the subject at the end of the experiment.
The main dependent measures were as follows: The
subjects' verbal reports were used to assess the
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development of a superstitious belief as to the 
efficaciousness of their behavior in obtaining reward. The 
development of stable superstitious behavior was assessed 
by the presence or absence of repeating patterns of 
keypresses in the data files recorded by the micro­
computer. For the purposes of this study, a stable 
superstitious response was defined as a distinct, 
recognizable pattern of keypresses which was repeated three 
or more times and was the dominant mode of responding at 
___the_ end—of—the—fj,£th—period—of-̂ the—experiment—and—wets—also- 
repeated at the beginning of the extinction period. The 
strength of the superstitious response was assessed in the 
following four ways: (1) the length of the response, in
number of characters; (2) the complexity of the response, 
defined in terms of either the presence of repeating 
patterns of characters within individual discrete responses 
or as the presence or absence of progressive, rotating 
higher order patterns of responding (see below); (3) the 
length of time which passed before development of the 
stable superstitious response, with shorter development 
times representing stronger superstitious behavior; and 
(4) the resistance to extinction of the superstitious 
response, with more persistent behavior (longer elapsed 
times to the cessation of the behavior) representing 
stronger superstitious behavior. (See Appendix 4 for a 
formal scoring protocol for evaluating superstitious
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beliefs and behaviors.)
Response complexity is not readily amenable to 
analysis by merely counting the number of response 
characters, as subjects can be quite creative (and 
unpredictable) in generating solutions to the problem 
presented by the experimental protocol. For example, 
during initial pilot work, one subject stated that she used 
a rotating sequence of number keys to obtain the 
reinforcements available on the computer game; that is, she 
-pressed—the—1-7— 2,— 3-7— 4 ,-5 , -6 /-7T-g~— 9-,— and—0- (zero) - keys- in—  
a rotating sequence. Furthermore, she paused approximately 
four seconds between each response, timing her responses by 
counting cursor flashes on the computer screen. Such 
higher order responses have been reported by other 
investigators using response-independent reinforcement.
Wright (19 62) noted a pattern of systematic rotation of 
responses in some of his subjects (similar to the subject 
discussed above). Wright ascribed this behavior to the 
instances of nonreward which his subjects experienced 
throughout the course of the experiment. For purposes of 
analysis in the present experiment, each such instance of a 
higher order superstitious response was classified as a 
complex response. In addition, repeating patterns of 
characters within individual discrete responses (such as 
"thth, thth...") were also classified as complex. (See 
Appendix 4, Scoring Protocol, for a detailed discussion of
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the determination of response complexity.)
As some degree of judgment is involved in determining 
the presence or absence of superstitious behaviors and 
beliefs, two raters were trained to evaluate the main 
dependent measures discussed above. A formal scoring 
protocol was developed, and was used by each rater to 
evaluate the presence or absence of superstitious behaviors 
and beliefs, as well as the length and complexity of the 
superstitious response, the time it was established, and 
—also the time it took to extinguish (see Appendix 4) .—  The 
judgments of the two raters were subjected to an inter­
rater reliability analysis in an attempt to demonstrate the 
stability (and the teachability) of the concept of 
superstitious behavior and belief, as conceived and applied 
within the current experimental paradigm.
Additional measures which were used to evaluate 
possible confounding variables included: age, typing
ability, level of perceived frustration before and after 
the extinction trial, and the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, the Profile of Mood States, and the Computer 
Anxiety Rating Scale.
Internals frequently exhibit higher levels of 
frustration than do externals in ambiguous learning 
situations (Libb & Serum, 1974; Miller, 1978). Since 
frustration was a possible confounding variable in the 
present experiment, subjects were asked to rate their
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perceived level of frustration (on a scale of one to five) 
immediately before and immediately after the extinction 
session. Both questions were posed during the exit 
interview after the completion of the experiment (see 
Appendix 2, Exit Interview).
Anxiety was also a possible confounding factor in the 
present experiment. Externals have demonstrated higher 
levels of debilitating anxiety and lower levels of 
facilitating anxiety when compared to internals 
(Butterfield, 1964; Spielberger, 1966). Externals display 
higher levels of trait anxiety (DeMan & Simpson-Housley, 
1985; Johnson & Sarason, 1978; Lusk, 1983) and state 
anxiety (Hoehn-Saric & McLeod, 1985; Phares, 1976) than do 
internals. In addition, externals have demonstrated higher 
levels of anxiety in situations perceived as threatening 
(Joe, 1971; Lefcourt, 1972), and such anxiety has been 
shown to have a detrimental effect on incidental learning 
(Spielberger, 1966). Because of these apparent differences 
in anxiety between internals and externals, measures of 
anxiety and emotionality were administered after the end of 
the experiment to check for possible differences in affect 
between the experimental groups. The Profile of Mood 
States (POMS) (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1992) and the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) (Spielberger, 1983) 
were administered during the exit interview to check for 
differences in generalized state anxiety, trait anxiety,
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and other possible emotional states (see Appendix 2, Exit 
Interview).
In addition, externals have been demonstrated to have 
higher levels of computer anxiety than internals 
(Harrington, 1988; Igbaria & Parasuraman, 1989; Parasuraman 
& Igbaria, 1990), where computer anxiety is defined as a 
negative affective response involving fear, apprehension, 
intimidation, hostility, and/or worries that one will be 
embarrassed or look stupid when using a computer, resulting
 i n_re si s t a nc e_t o_ a nd—avo idanc e—o f—computer̂ -fee ehno 1-ogy — —
(Heinssen, Glass, & Knight, 1987). The Computer Anxiety 
Rating Scale (CARS) (Heinssen et al., 1987; Meier &
Lambert, 1991; Zakrajsek, Waters, Popovich, Craft, & 
Hampton, 1990) was administered to all subjects after the 
completion of the experiment to check for possible 
confounding effects of this construct (see Appendix 2, Exit 
Interview).
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Results
Interrater Reliability. Interrater agreement 
coefficients are presented in Table 2. Cohen's k for the 
main dependent measures of the presence or absence of 
superstitious beliefs and behaviors were .78 and .74, 
respectively, which is an acceptable level of agreement. 
Cohen's k for the complexity of the superstitious response 
was not calculated as only four records were available for
analysis. The Pearson Product Moment Correlations (PMC)___
for the length of the superstitious response and for the 
time it took for the superstitious response to become 
established and to extinguish were not calculated for the 
same reason. When judging for the presence or absence of a 
superstitious behavior, the two raters agreed that such 
behaviors existed in only four of the twenty records which 
were jointly rated. Superstitious behaviors turned out to 
be such low probability behaviors that sufficient numbers 
of cases were not generated to produce a meaningful Cohen's 
k or Pearson PMC for the four measures which were dependent 
on their presence. An n of four would have yielded 
unacceptable accuracy for these statistics, and thus the 
calculations were not attempted. Of the four records rated 
by both judges which contained superstitious behaviors, the 
judges were in 75% agreement as to the length of the 
superstitious response, the complexity of the response, and
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Table 2. Interrater Reliability Statistics for 
Superstitious Beliefs and Behaviors: Percent agreement and
Cohen's Kappa (k) for Nominal Data. Adjusted for the Value 
Under Chance (n=201.
Superstitious Belief k = .78 90% agreement
Superstitious Behavior k = .74 90% agreement
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the time it took for the response to become established.
The raters were in 50% agreement on the time it took for 
the superstitious response to extinguish.
In considering the difficulty of judging the presence 
or absence of superstitious beliefs and behaviors, it 
should be noted that even with the use of a formal scoring 
protocol, some judgment was necessary in determining the 
presence or absence of superstitious beliefs and behaviors 
and in evaluating the other related variables. The formal
scoring protocol used to define superstitious behaviors____
operationally probably led to some behaviors being 
classified as superstitious when in fact they were not.
For example, some subjects stated that they ran through 
typing drills to pass the time after discovering that 
nothing they did on the computer keyboard allowed them to 
affect the number of points that were awarded. One subject 
practiced typing musical scales. Some of these behaviors 
were no doubt coded as superstitious, despite the fact that 
the subjects stated that nothing they did affected their 
ability to obtain points from the computer. In this 
regard, the operational definition of a superstitious 
behavior employed by Van Raalte et al. (1991), the tendency 
to use a lucky ball in their golf putting paradigm, was 
much cleaner and much easier to evaluate than the repeating 
patterns of keypresses used in the present experiment. In 
addition to these definitional and evaluation problems, one
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of the raters made two unequivocal errors in scoring the 
time to extinction of the superstitious response. Other 
outright errors may have occurred as well. All of these 
factors contributed to difficulties in obtaining agreement 
between the two raters for these variables.
Main Dependent Measures. There were no significant 
effects for the sex of the subject on any of the dependent 
measures, nor were there any significant interactions for 
sex and locus of control for any of the dependent measures
_(.see__da-ta- analysis- in_Appendix—5)-. The—percentage—of------
internals and externals developing superstitious beliefs 
and behaviors is presented in Table 3. Significantly more 
externals than internals developed a superstitious belief 
that their efforts on the keyboard were effective in
altering their ability to obtain points from the computer.
This finding is in direct opposition to the major
hypothesis of this study, that is, that internals would be
more likely to develop such beliefs. In addition, 
externals were also more likely than internals to develop 
superstitious patterns of responding on the keyboard, 
directly contrary to the second hypothesis. This effect, 
however, was not significant (see Appendix 5, Data 
Analysis).
Means for the length of the superstitious responses 
which were generated, for the time it took for the 
superstitious response to become established, and for the
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Table 3. Percent of Internals and Externals Displaying 
Superstitious—Belie fs___and-Behaviors—Xn—in—paren-thesesi—
Internals (34) Externals (34)
Belief 26.5%a (9) 52.9%b (18)
Behavior 17.6% (6) 26.5% (9)
Within each row, figures with different subscripts 
differ from one another at the .05 level.
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time to extinction of the superstitious response are 
presented in Table 4. A description of the complexity of 
the superstitious responses generated by internals and 
externals is presented in Table 5. There were no 
significant effects for locus of control (or sex of the 
subject) for any of these variables (see Appendix 5, Data 
Analysis). Thus, hypotheses three, four, five, and six 
were not supported. The superstitious response patterns of 
internals were not longer than those of externals, nor were
theŷ  more_ complexExternals did not take longer to______
develop superstitious responses. The superstitious 
responses of internals were not more resistant to 
extinction than were those of externals.
Ancillary Dependent Measures. Means for several 
ancillary dependent measures are presented in Table 6. 
Hypothesis seven was supported. Externals displayed 
significantly higher levels of both state anxiety and trait 
anxiety, as measured by the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI). Externals also achieved higher scores on the 
Computer Anxiety Rating Scale (CARS). Although the latter 
effect was not significant, it was in the predicted 
direction of externality being correlated with higher 
levels of anxiety.
Externals also scored significantly higher on the 
C-scale (Confusion-Bewilderment) of the Profile of Mood 
States (POMS) and significantly lower than internals on the
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Table 4. Means for Main Dependent Measures for Female and 
Male Internals and Externals Who Developed Stable 
Superstitious Behaviors.
Females Males
Internals Externals Internals Externals
Length of Response 
(no. of characters) 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.8
Length of Time for 
Response to Become
Established (sec) 243.7 294.9 148.2 228.9
Time to Extinction___________ _________________ _________ _
of Response (sec) 15.5 12.9 12.6 14.1
None of these values differ significantly from one 
another at the .05 level.
Table 5. Percent of Internals and Externals Represented in 
Each of Four Response Complexity Categories (Only for Those 
Developing Superstitious Behaviors: n in parentheses)♦
Internals (6) Externals (9)
Short Simple 0.0% (0) 44.4% (4)
Short Complex 50.0% (3) 11.1% (1)
Long Simple 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0)
Long Complex 50.0% (3) 44.4% (4)
None of these values differ significantly from one 
another at the .05 level.
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Table 6. Means for Ancillary Deoendent Measures for Female
and Male Internals and Externals.
Females Males
Internals Externals Internals Externals
CARS score 35.14 45.71 40.17 39.71
STAI State score 32.64a 37.53b 32.75a 41.00b
STAI Trait score 35.82a 40.94. 30.17a 42_. 4.1*,
POMS T-scale score
a
6.00
b
6.35
a
6.25
D
8.94
POMS D-scale score 3 .86 2 .53 2.42 5.82
POMS A-scale score 3.00 2.82 5.58 4.76
POMS V-scale score 16.55a 13.35b 15.42a 12.12b
POMS F-scale score 7.27 5.59 3 . 00 7.71
POMS C-scale score 6.50a 8.35b 4 • 8 3 a 9.88b
Frustration Before 
Extinction Trial 1.76a 2.53b 2.00a 2.18b
Frustration After 
Extinction Trial 2.52a 3.65b 3.08a 3.41b
Age of Subject 24.09 21. 65 27.00 21.88
Typing Ability 
(1 to 10 scale) 6.09 5.41 4.50 5.24
Within each row, figures with different subscripts 
differ from one another at the .05 level.
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POMS V-scale (Vigor-Activity). Thus, externals were more 
likely to be confused about what they were doing in the 
experiment, to be less sure of their actions, and to pursue 
those actions with less enthusiasm and energy. Internals, 
on the other hand, were more likely to feel as if they had 
a clear idea of what was going on in the experiment and 
what was expected of them, and to display higher energy 
levels in their approach to the experiment. Results for 
the POMS T-scale (Tension-Anxiety), D-scale (Depression-
Dejection), A-scale (Anger-Hostility), and F-scale_________
(Fatigue-Inertia) did not display any significant 
differences for either locus of control or for sex.
Externals reported significantly more frustration than 
did internals both before and after the extinction trial, 
when no points were available on the computer (see Table 
6). While no specific hypothesis was formulated relative 
to frustration, one might have expected internals to have 
reported higher levels of frustration in this experiment, 
since internals frequently exhibit higher levels of 
frustration than do externals in ambiguous learning 
situations (Libb & Serum, 1974; Miller, 1978). The level 
of frustration experienced by both internals and externals 
increased over the course of the extinction period, so that 
both groups felt significantly more frustrated at the end 
of the period than at the beginning (see Frustration 
Repeated Measures ANOVA in Appendix 5, Data Analysis).
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The effects for age of the subject and for self- 
reported typing ability (on a scale of one to ten) did not 
differ significantly across sex or locus of control (see 
Table 6). Nor were there significant differences for 
whether or not the subject knew how to type using typing 
fingering (see Table 7) or for the kind of fingering used 
to manipulate the keyboard (typing fingering vs. "hunt and 
peck;" see Table 8).
Hypothesis eight stated that internals would be more 
lik-ei-y--than externals to deveTop superstitfous 'behaviors in 
the absence of a superstitious belief. This hypothesis was 
not supported by the data. Only four subjects developed 
such behaviors in the absence of a corresponding 
superstitious belief, and internals were no more likely 
than externals to develop such behaviors (see Table 9).
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Table 7. Percent of Internals and Externals Stating that 
they Possessed the Ability to Type (Using Typing Fingering; 
n in parentheses).
Internals (34) Externals (34) 
Possess Typing Ability 94.1% (32) 91.2% (31)
Unable to Type 5.9% (2) 8.8% (3)
None of these values differ significantly from one 
another at the .05 level. ____________ __________
Table 8. Percent of Internals and Externals Using Typing 
Fingering vs. "Hunt and Peck1 Method of Manipulating the 
Computer Keyboard fn in parentheses^.
Internals (34) Externals (34)
Typing Fingering 14.7% (5) 14.7% (5)
Hunt and Peck 67.6% (23) 79.4% (27)
Both 17.6% (6) 5.9% (2)
None of these values differ significantly from one 
another at the .05 level.
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Table 9. Percent of Internals and Externals Displaying a 
Superstitious Behavior Without a Corresponding Belief 
(n in parentheses).
Internals (25) Externals (16)
%
Presence of a Superstitious 
Behavior in the Absence of
a Corresponding Belief 4.0% (1) 18.8% (3)
Lack of a Superstitious 
Behavior in the Absence of
a Corresponding Belief 96.0% (24) 81.3% (13)
None of these values differ significantly from one 
another at the .05 level.
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Discussion
None of the main hypotheses regarding the differential 
effects of locus of control were supported by the results 
of this experiment. In this setting, internals were not 
more likely to develop superstitious beliefs or behaviors 
than were externals. In fact, the main finding of this 
experiment was that subjects with an external locus of 
control were more likely to have developed a superstitious
— bei-i-e-f—fehan—were—•those—w-i-th—an—internal— l̂ocus—of_contro-l-, _
directly contrary to the hypothesized effect. It seems 
likely that this result was a consequence of the 
experimental paradigm employed.
As outlined in the introduction, the analog 
experimental designs traditionally used to investigate the 
learning of superstitious behavior in humans are not true 
incidental learning paradigms, since the instructions 
generally indicate that the subject is to determine (or 
learn) how to receive reinforcements within the 
experimental environment. The instructions are generally 
couched in terms of learning to solve a problem. The 
instructions for the present experiment fit this 
description. A problem-solving bias was introduced by the 
instructions accompanying the experimental protocol when 
subjects were asked to figure out how to obtain 
reinforcements (points) from the computer. Internals took
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these instructions to heart and were in fact better at 
determining that reinforcement was not contingent on 
whatever responses they might make on the keyboard. This 
line of reasoning is consistent with the work reviewed 
earlier on noncontingency detection conducted by R.H. 
Poresky (1969/1970, 1971, 1975). In fact, Poresky 
(personal communication, January 17, 1992) believes that 
internals would be more likely than externals to detect the 
lack of contingency between their responses and the 
_rja infjar_cemen_ts_tha.t-they -receive, _based_j3n__the_s_peculation._ 
that internals would be more aware of their environment and 
also more willing to admit that there were portions of the 
environment that they could not control. Indeed, one way 
of conceptualizing the results of the present experiment is 
that given the particular experimental paradigm employed, 
internals were better contingency detectors than were 
externals, and thus were less likely to act as if (or 
believe) that causal contingencies existed between their 
behaviors and the rewards they received from the computer 
game. This line of reasoning is consistent with the 
observations outlined earlier that internals tend to be 
more cognitively aware, more cognitively active, more 
attentive to informational cues in uncertain situations, 
more task-oriented, better at information extraction and 
utilization in problem-solving tasks and better problem- 
solvers in general, more resistant to subtle manipulation
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and harder to condition, more trusting of their own 
judgments and less likely to conform to influences which 
violate those judgments, and of course, better than 
externals at determining the contingencies of reinforcement 
(Crowne & Liverant, 1963; DuCette & Wolk, 1973; Lefcourt, 
1982; Lefcourt et al., 1973; Lefcourt & Wine, 1969; Phares, 
197 6; Ryckman, 1979; Ude & Vogler> 1969). In the present 
experiment, internals were better at detecting the 
contingencies of reinforcement than were externals, most
 likely—because—subjects—were—told—'they—were—-to—soive-the---
problem of how to receive reinforcements from the computer. 
Apparently, internals paid close attention to these 
instructions and then proceeded to solve the problem 
correctly. In other words, by introducing an intent to 
learn, the present experimental paradigm created an 
environment which was not truly an incidental learning 
situation, since true incidental learning occurs in the 
absence of an intent to learn. Instead, the instructions 
induced a problem-solving bias in the subjects. This flaw 
is inherent in most of the experimental paradigms used to 
investigate the learning of superstitious behaviors by 
humans, and to the extent that these experiments 
necessarily create an intent to learn in their subjects, 
they are more or less flawed. The golf putting paradigm of 
Van Raalte et al. (1991) avoids the intent to learn problem 
since it purports to measure a pre-existing skill and does
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not ask subjects to try to learn anything. In addition, 
the superstitious response which developed in their 
experiment, the use of a lucky ball, was truly independent 
of the reinforcement received, success at sinking putts. 
From this reasoning, and following the line of argument 
developed earlier in the introduction, it seems that the 
paradigm used by Van Raalte et al. is the better vehicle 
for investigating the learning of personal superstitions.
In the introduction to this paper it was pointed out 
—that“the acquisition of behavior is often exquisitely” 
sensitive to the molecular topography of the reinforcement 
schedule and to the experimental setting used in any given 
project. For this reason, differing procedures can produce 
different results even when investigating ostensibly 
similar phenomena. In questions concerned with human 
learning, Wasserman and his colleagues (Chatlosh, Neunaber, 
& Wasserman, 1985; Wasserman, Chatlosh, & Neunaber, 1983; 
Wasserman & Neunaber, 1986) point out that it is best to 
phrase any discussion of problems with differential 
experimental results within any given field of 
investigation in terms of the temporal parameters which 
define the schedules of reinforcement in use, differences 
in environmental or procedural circumstances, or 
differences in the populations from which subjects are 
drawn. In line with the above argument, Justice and Looney 
(1990) also note that reinforcers have multiple effects,
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and that desired behavioral effects may be achieved by the 
proper specification of schedules of reinforcement and 
environmental contingencies. By paying attention to these 
factors, researchers can obtain a variety of differing 
effects for their manipulations. Experiments can be 
devised which inadvertently favor one outcome over another. 
This is apparently what happened in the present 
circumstance. By introducing an intent to learn in the 
subjects, the environmental conditions necessary for a true 
incidentai rearning^situation were violated. In addition, 
problem-solving conditions were fostered which favored the 
superior cognitive abilities of internals, so that they 
were able to decipher the true contingencies between 
responses and reinforcers within the experimental design, 
and thus avoid developing superstitious beliefs.
Externals, on the other hand, were less likely to solve the 
problem correctly, and consequently to develop a 
superstitious belief that they were affecting the delivery 
of reinforcements in some fashion.
As hypothesized, externals displayed a higher degree 
of anxiety than did internals. This effect was seen on 
both the State and Trait forms of the STAI. As 
superstitious beliefs can help to reduce anxiety and 
uncertainty, it is perhaps not surprising that in this 
paradigm (which apparently was not truly an incidental 
learning paradigm) externals were more likely to develop
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superstitious beliefs than were internals. Following the 
lines of reasoning contained in Rotter's (1954, 1966) 
social learning theory, in the absence of any effects from 
incidental learning, one would expect that externals would 
be more likely to develop and endorse superstitious 
beliefs, as in the present experiment. Interestingly, 
externals also displayed higher levels of frustration. One 
might have expected internals to have been more frustrated, 
since internals frequently exhibit higher levels of 
frustration than do externals in ambiguous learning 
situations (Libb & Serum, 1974; Miller, 1978) . One 
possible explanation for the contrary result is that 
internals at least did not find the learning situation in 
the present experiment to be ambiguous. Externals may also 
have felt more frustrated than internals because externals 
felt less in control of the situation, as might be expected 
since they were not as adept as internals at discovering 
the correct solution to the problem presented by the 
experimental paradigm. These conjectures are also 
supported by the observed differences between internals and 
externals on the Profile of Mood States (POMS). Externals 
were more likely to be confused about what they were doing 
in the experiment, to be less sure of their actions, and to 
pursue those actions with less enthusiasm and energy. 
Internals, on the other hand, were more likely to feel as 
if they had a clear idea of what was going on in the
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experiment and what was expected of them, and to display 
higher energy levels in their approach to the experiment. 
These differences could have resulted in a differential 
mobilization of the cognitive resources needed to 
successfully solve the puzzle presented by the experimental 
paradigm, with the end result that internals were better 
than externals at avoiding developing a superstitious 
belief as to their own efficacy at securing reinforcements 
from the computer.
In summary, the contradiction—in—resutts—obba-ined—by—  
Van Raalte et al. (1991), that internals were more likely 
to learn personal superstitions, and the present study, 
that externals were more likely to learn personal 
superstitions, serves as an excellent illustration of the 
observation presented earlier, that experimenters can often 
design experiments which enhance certain effects at the 
expense of other effects. The design of the present 
experiment, since it was not a true incidental learning 
paradigm and since it induced a problem-solving bias in the 
subjects, inadvertently made it more likely that internals 
would put their problem-solving skills to full use and 
determine that their actions did not in fact affect the 
reinforcements they received from the computer. Externals, 
on the other hand, seemed muddled and confused by the 
experiment, as well as frustrated, and as an apparent 
consequence they were more likely to develop a
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superstitious belief to help them cope with the situation 
in which they found themselves. Thus, the present 
experimental design is lacking in manipulative power and in 
validity as an incidental learning paradigm to the same 
extent that it introduces a problem-solving bias in the 
subjects. The same criticism applies to other experimental 
paradigms used in the field of superstitious learning in̂  
humans. The golf-putting paradigm of Van Raalte et al., 
being a true incidental learning paradigm, did in fact 
produce more superstitious behavior in internals than in 
externals. This is, of course, the effect hypothesized on 
both theoretical and empirical grounds in both papers. The 
major conclusion of this paper is that the golf-putting 
paradigm is a better vehicle for investigating the learning 
of personal superstitions in human beings and that 
traditional methods of inculcating superstitious beliefs 
and behaviors are less than adequate.
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APPENDIX 1
PROGRAM FOR PROTOCOL
Display the following statement: "Please enter subject
identification _____ " (file INS.OB).
Create a data file using subject's identification for the 
root. Each of the six separate periods will create a new 
data file with the same root and an extension corresponding 
to the period for which the data is being recorded (1-6).
Display file INS.IB
When the subject presses the space bar, award points on a 
VT 5 sec schedule after a keypress on any key on the 
keyboard, and display accumulated points in the center of 
the screen. The variable time (VT) schedule will range 
from 3 to 7 seconds, so that the average of all time 
intervals equals 5 seconds. Record all keystrokes on the 
keyboard in the data file, along with the elapsed time from 
the beginning of the experimental session, in seconds, and 
the elapsed time from the previous keystroke. Also record 
the actual time (in seconds, from the start of the session) 
that each 10 point reinforcement was received. Data file 
in four rows: top row the keystroke; second and third rows 
the elapsed time since the start of the session and the 
elapsed time since the previous keystroke, respectively, 
for the keystroke recorded in the first row; fourth row the 
time each 10 point reinforcement was received.
At the end of 120 seconds, display file INS.2B, along with 
the total number of points earned in the first period (in 
the appropriate spot). When the subject presses the space 
bar, begin the second period, following the protocol in the 
above paragraph.
At the end of each period (through period 5), repeat the 
cycle.
Display file INS.3B at the end of the second period,
file INS.4B at the end of the third period,
file INS.5B at the end of the fourth period, and
file INS.6B at the end of the fifth period
along with the points accumulated for each period.
When the subject presses the space bar to begin the sixth 
period, record all keystrokes as per the above protocol, 
but do not award any points. At the end of 240 seconds 
display file INS.7B for 60 seconds, then exit program after 
one minute.
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File INS.IB:
WELCOME TO INVESTIGATION OF LEARNING
This experiment is a computer controlled problem 
solving experiment designed to investigate some basic 
principles in human learning. We are trying to determine 
how many different ways people devise to solve a particular 
problem. There is no right or wrong way to solve this 
problem, just different possible methods. The experiment 
is set up in the form of a game. When the experiment 
starts, you will be able to accumulate points by 
manipulating the ten number keys across the top of the 
character keys on the keyboard, that is, on the 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 0 (zero) keys. During the experiment 
none of the other keys will have any effect on what the 
computer does or on your ability to earn points. Your task 
is to figure out how to win points. Try to win as many
points as possible. Press only-one-key-at—a—t-i-me-i Do—not—
hold any key down after pressing it.
The experiment is divided into six different periods, 
each of which is approximately two minutes in length. You 
may rest for a short while before beginning the next 
period. Accumulated points for each period will be 
displayed in the center of the computer screen. The 
counter will reset to zero at the beginning of each period. 
If you have any questions about the procedure, please ask 
the experimenter at this time. Press the space bar when 
you are ready to begin. Good luck and have fun.
File INS.2B:
Congratulations. You have won points
in the first period of the experiment.
Press the space bar 
when you are ready to begin the second period.
File INS.3B:
Congratulations. You have won points
in the second period of the experiment.
Press the space bar 
when you are ready to begin the third period.
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File INS.4B:
Congratulations. You have won points
in the third period of the experiment.
Press the space bar 
when you are ready to begin the fourth period.
File INS.5B:
Congratulations. You have won points
in the fourth period of the experiment.
Press the space bar 
when you are ready to begin the fifth period.
File INS.6B:
Congratulations. You have won points
in the fifth period of the experiment.
Press the space bar 
when you are ready to begin the sixth period.
File INS.7B:
Congratulations. You have won 0 points 
in the sixth period of the experiment.
The experiment is now over.
Please call the experimenter for your debriefing.
Thank you for helping out with our experiment. 
Please do not tell anyone about what you did here today; 
we do not want to contaminate our future results.
Thank you.
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APPENDIX 2
EXIT INTERVIEW
After the end of the extinction trial (when the experiment 
has been completed) each subject will be asked if they 
learned what pattern of responses was necessary for them to 
earn points during each period of the program. They will 
be asked to describe what they believed they had to do to 
earn the points, and what pattern of keystrokes they 
believed were responsible for the reinforcements that they 
received.
Next, the following statement will be made to each subject: 
"Many people find it frustrating to work with a computer, 
especially when they don't really know how to make it do 
what “they want. Also, some people find the last period ~of~ 
the experiment frustrating when they can't get any more 
points. Try to put yourself back to the time just before 
the last period of the experiment. On a scale of 1 to 5, 
with 1 being not frustrated at all and 5 being extremely 
frustrated, can you tell me how frustrated you felt? How 
frustrated were you at the very end of the experiment?" A 
card containing a five point rating scale for frustration, 
similar to the scale on page 2 of this appendix, will be 
placed in front of the subject to help them formulate their 
answer.
Each subject will then be asked their age and whether or 
not they know how to type. If they know how to type, they 
will be asked to rate their perceived level of typing 
ability, on a scale of l to 10, and whether they used 
typing fingering to make keystrokes or just used the "hunt 
and peck" method.
Each subject will then be administered the Profile of Mood 
States (POMS), the Computer Anxiety Rating Scale (CARS), 
and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), in that 
order.
Subjects will then be debriefed.
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DEBRIEFING FORM
Subject ID ____________
What did you have to do to earn points on the computer? 
(list any actions or patterns of keystrokes the subject 
describes)
How much frustration did you feel before the last period 
began?
1 2 3 4 5
none a moderate quite extreme
little amount a lot
How much frustration did you feel at the end of the 
experiment?
1 2 3 4 5
none a moderate quite extreme
little amount a lot
Age:
Can you type?
Typing ability, on a scale of 1 to 10:
Did you use typing fingering during this experiment, or did 
you just use the "hunt and peck" method to press the keys?
Other notes and observations:
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APPENDIX 3 
DEBRIEF
Subjects will be told that what we were interested in 
measuring was the length and complexity of the responses 
that they developed to earn "points” on the computer game. 
There were no right or wrong ways to earn points, just 
different methods devised by different people. Subjects 
were chosen on the basis of their responses to the scales 
that they filled out during the group screening at the 
beginning of the term. We expected people who had 
different characteristics (as measured by the screening) to 
develop different patterns of responding on the computer 
game.
If people inquire about the characteristics that we used to 
choose subjects, they will be told that they were chosen on 
the basis of their locus of control, and this concept will 
be briefly explained to them if they do not know what it 
is. If they request more specific information they will be 
told that we expected to find that people with an internal 
locus of control were more likely to develop longer and 
more complex solutions to the computer game than were 
people with an external locus of control. This information 
will only be furnished to subjects who specifically inquire 
about details of the experiment.
Subjects will not be told that the computer automatically 
awarded "points" independently of subjects' responding on 
the keyboard, as such a revelation would be too damaging to 
the experiment if it became general knowledge. (If 
subjects learn this information for themselves during the 
course of the experiment we will, of course, verify it 
during the debriefing.) All subjects will be told that 
there were no points available during the last period of 
the experiment. If subjects have any further questions 
that the experimenter cannot answer (such as an individual 
subject's locus of control) they will be referred to Guy 
Bateman for further information. Mr. Bateman's name and 
phone number will be offered to all subjects in case they 
have any further questions.
The debriefing will conclude with an appeal to the subjects 
to keep the procedures and purpose of the experiment 
confidential, because we do not want to have the results 
contaminated.
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APPENDIX 4 
SCORING PROTOCOL 
Criteria for Assessing Superstitious Beliefs
The subjects' verbal reports from the exit interview 
will be used to assess the development of a superstitious 
belief as to the efficaciousness of their behavior in 
obtaining reward. A superstitious belief is a verbal 
statement that: (1) the subject had to perform some
specific action to obtain points on the computer, or (2)
that something that they did affected their ability to 
receive points in some fashion.
Examples of the first type of belief would be 
statements of the following nature:
I entered my name on the keyboard.
I just typed in the number of points that were showing 
on the computer screen ...
I typed in "10" because that's the number of points I 
got each time.
I typed the next number that I expected to get, that
is, if I had 120 points, I would type in "130."
Nine worked. I typed nine and waited for the points 
to come up on the screen.
I typed in even sequences of numbers. 2, 4, 6, 8, 
etc. I also typed in his sequence backwards.
I typed in 12. If I did this several times I would 
get ten points, then I would type it in some more.
Examples of the second type of belief would include 
statements such as the following:
I just pressed any number key a large number of times 
in a row.
Any number worked to get points, but some worked 
better than others. Six worked best.
I counted the cursor flashes and then typed in a 
number. Any number worked if I waited at least 10 flashes.
I just waited four seconds between punching in a 
number. I counted to four in my head.
I'm sure that there was some kind of number pattern or 
a tigie pattern, but I couldn't figure out exactly what it 
was.
Sequences of numbers were important in getting points. 
It didn't matter what sequence, as long as you typed three 
or more numbers in a row.
It didn't matter what I pressed, but I had to press 
the zero key to get the game started.
I just punched in odd numbers.
* These beliefs are unlikely to have any 
corresponding superstitious behaviors.
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SCORING PROTOCOL 
Criteria for Assessing Superstitious Behaviors
Presence or absence of stable superstitious behavior: 
The development of stable superstitious behavior will be 
assessed by the presence or absence of repeating patterns 
of keypresses in the data files recorded by the micro­
computer. A stable superstitious response is defined as a 
distinct, recognizable pattern of keypresses which is: A)
repeated three or more times at the end of the fifth period 
of the experiment; and B) is also repeated at least once at 
the beginning of the extinction period. Assessment of the 
presence of a stable response will initially be done 
without reference to the subject's stated belief. If a 
stable response cannot be identified on the basis of the 
information contained in the data files alone, the 
subject's stated belief (from the exit interview) will be 
used as a clue to search for stable patterns of keypresses. 
It is possible that stable patterns of superstitious 
behavior (in the form of repeating patterns of keypresses) 
will be present in the data files in the absence of a 
stated belief, and it is also possible that a stated 
superstitious belief will be present in the absence of 
evidence in the data files of stable superstitious 
behavior.
The presence of a repeating pattern of keypresses will 
first be assessed by visual inspection of the responses the 
subject made at the end of the fifth period of the 
experiment. The responses will generally be one, two, or 
three characters long. For example, a subject might type 
"12, 12, 12," etc. A commonly seen pattern is for the 
subject to type in the number which is shown on the screen, 
or to type in the number that they anticipate will show up 
on the screen next. For example, if the screen displays 
the number "210," the subject may enter either "210" or 
"220" on the keyboard. Instances may arise where it is 
unclear what sequence of keys the subject may be pressing, 
for example, if they press a sequence of nines: 
"999999999999999," etc. This may be a series of nines, a 
series of ninety-nines, or a series of nine hundred and 
ninety-nines, etc. These ambiguous instances will be 
resolved by referencing the times that have elapsed between 
successive keystrokes. For example, if .3 sec elapsed 
between the the first and the second nine in the example 
above, but 4.0 sec elapsed between the second and third, 
and this pattern repeated throughout the sequence of 
keypresses, it is apparent that the subject typed "99, 99, 
99," etc. Conversely, if .3 sec elapsed between the first 
and second nine and also the second and third, but 4.0 sec 
elapsed between the third and the fourth nine, it is
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•apparent that the subject typed "999, 999, 999," etc. This 
technique of examining the elapsed time between successive 
keystrokes can be applied to any ambiguous sequence of 
keystrokes where uncertainty exists as to what the subject 
was typing on the keyboard.
If a pattern of keypresses is identified as being 
present at the end of the fifth period, it must be verified 
as being present at the beginning of the extinction period 
before it can be classified as stable. If stable 
superstitious behaviors cannot be detected by an initial 
examination of the data file, reference will be made to the 
subject's stated superstitious belief (if any), and the 
files re-examined in the light of such a stated belief, as 
indicated above.
Assessing the strength of the superstitious behavior: 
The strength of the superstitious response will be assessed 
in the following ways: (1) the length of the response, (2)
the complexity of the response, (3) the length of time 
which passed before development of the stable superstitious 
response, and (4) the resistance to extinction of the 
superstitious response.
The length of the response will be assessed by 
counting the number of characters in the response. A 
response with one character will receive a score of 1, a 
response with three characters will receive a score of 3, 
etc. If the subjects uses a higher order response pattern 
(see below) the length of their response will be based on 
the longest discrete response emitted in the higher order 
response sequence. Scores can range from one to a very 
large number somewhat short of infinity.
The complexity of the response will be assessed by 
classifying responses into long or short categories and 
into complex or simple categories. Crossing the two 
categories will result in a total of four separate 
complexity ratings: long complex responses, short complex
responses, long simple responses, and short simple 
responses. A short response will be one that is one or two 
characters in length. A long response will be one that is 
three or more characters in length. Complex responses will 
be: (1) all higher order responses (see below), and (2)
all responses which display repeating patterns of 
characters within individual discrete responses. For 
example, a response of "thth, thth," etc., would be 
classified as complex because the sequence "th" is repeated 
within an individual response. A response of "99" would 
also be classified as complex. Responses which do not fall 
into either of the two categories above will be classified 
as simple. For example, "8, 8, 8, 8," etc. would be a 
simple response.
The presence of progressive, rotating higher order 
patterns of responding is to be expected. As noted above,
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subjects often enter into the computer the number which is 
displayed (or which they anticipate to be displayed) on the 
computer screen. As further examples of rotating higher 
order patterns of responding, one subject stated that they 
used a rotating sequence of number keys to obtain the 
reinforcements available on the computer game, that is, 
they pressed the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 0 (zero) 
keys in a rotating sequence, pausing after each keypress 
until they had received a reinforcement. Another subject 
stated that they paused approximately four seconds between 
each response that they made, timing their responses by 
counting cursor flashes on the computer screen and then 
typing in a "5." Each such instance of a higher order 
superstitious response will be classified as a complex 
response. Whether or not a higher order response is 
classified as long or short will be based on the length of 
the longest discrete response emitted by the subject. For 
example, if the subject used the series "0, 10, 20, 30, 
40,... 200, 210, 220, 230, 2 4 0 the- length of their 
complexity score would be based on the responses "2 30,
240," etc. This example would be classified as a long 
complex response. The other two examples cited above 
(counting cursor flashes between responses and entering "1, 
2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0," and then starting over) would 
be classified as short complex responses.
The length of time which passed before the development 
of a stable superstitious response will be determined from 
reference to the responses in the data file. The point in 
time at which a stable superstitious response has developed 
will be defined as that point at which the response 
represents at least 90% of the responses the subject makes 
on the keyboard, from the point the response stabilizes 
until the end of the fifth experimental period. The length 
of time it takes for the stable superstitious response to 
develop will be defined as follows: The time, measured in
seconds, that elapses between start of the experiment and 
the first keystroke of the first instance of the stable 
superstitious response that marks the beginning of the 
period in which the stable response represents at least 90% 
of the responses on the keyboard, exclusive of the times 
the subject rested between experimental periods. For 
example, if the subject begins typing the number that is 
displayed on the computer screen 30.4 seconds into the 
third experimental period, and if this response constitutes 
at least 90% of their responses for the rest of the 
experiment up to the end of the fifth period of the 
experiment, the length of time which has passed is 
calculated as 270.4 seconds (120 seconds from the first 
period, 120 seconds from the second period, and 30.4 
seconds from the third period).
The resistance to extinction of the superstitious
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response will be measured, in seconds, from the beginning 
of the extinction period until the last keystroke of the 
last response emitted in the extinction period which is 
characteristic of the stable superstitious response in 
which the subject was engaging at the end of the fifth 
period of the experiment. For example, if the subject was 
using a rotating sequence of keypresses by typing the 
number of points displayed on the computer screen, at the 
end of the fifth period they might type "210, 220, 230, 
240." The expected pattern of keypresses at the beginning 
of the extinction period would be "0, 10, 20," etc., if 
reinforcement continued. If the subject types "0" several 
times, this would be construed as a perseveration in 
superstitious behavior in expectation of obtaining 
additional reinforcements from the computer. However, if 
the subject begins typing "9, 9, 9, 9, 9," or "6, 6, 6, 6," 
or "1, 2, 3, 4," or any other pattern of keystrokes not 
identical with their previous superstitious response 
pattern, or if they cease responding entirely, it can be 
said that their superstitious behavior has extinguished.
If they emitted the last "0" in the sequence of 
superstitious responding 20.9 seconds into the experimental 
period, this time would be taken as the measure of 
resistance to extinction.
Note that some specific beliefs may be very difficult 
to discern in the data files. For example, if a subject 
says that that they just typed in any number, but had to 
wait at least four seconds between numbers, a specific 
pattern of keystrokes would not be readily apparent in the 
data record. In this instance, the presence of a 
superstitious behavior could be verified if the data files 
indicated that the subject had in fact waited four seconds 
between successive keystrokes.
Belief: 
Behavior: 
Length:
Coding System
1 = presence of belief 
1 = presence of behavior 
(metric) number of characters
0 = absence 
0 = absence
Complexity: 1 = short simple
3 = long simple
2 = short complex 
4 = long complex
Time to establishment of the superstitious behavior: 
(metric) number of seconds
Time to extinction of the superstitious behavior: 
(metric) number of seconds
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APPENDIX 5: DATA ANALYSIS
Coding for Data Analysis
Sex: 1 = female 2 = male
LOC: 1 = internal 2 = external
Levenson Internal scale score (metric)
Levenson Chance scale score (metric)
Levenson Powerful Others scale score (metric)
Superstitious belief 1 = presence 0 = absence
Superstitious behavior 1 = presence 0 = absence
Length of superstitious behavior (metric) l to 6
Complexity of superstitious behavior
1 = short simple 2 = short complex
3 = long simple 4 = long complex
Time to establishment of the superstitious behavior:
(metric) number of seconds 
Time to extinction of the superstitious behavior:
(metric) number of seconds
CARS (metric)
STAI - State (metric) 
STAI - Trait (metric)
POMS - T scale (metric)
POMS - D scale (metric)
POMS - A scale (metric)
POMS - V scale (metric)
POMS - F scale (metric)
POMS - C scale (metric)
and (22) Frustration before and after the extinction 
period, respectively (metric) 1 to 5
Age (metric)
Presence of typing ability l=present 0=absent
Typing ability (metric) 1 to 10
Method of manipulating the keyboard:
1 = "hunt and peck" 2 = typing fingering
3 = both
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS: SUPERSTITIOUS BELIEF by SEX
SUPERSTITIOUS BELIEF BY LOC
BELIEF by SEX
BELIEF
SEX
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2 I Total
25
23.5
16
17.5
41
60.3%
14 13 27
15.5 11.5 39.7%
column 39 29 68
Total 57.4% 42.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
.24381 1 .62147
BELIEF by LOC
BELIEF
LOC
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2 I Total
25 16 41
20.5 20.5 60.3%
9 18 27
13.5 13.5 39.7%
column 34 34 68
Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
3.93135 1 .04739
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS: SUPERSTITIOUS BEHAVIOR by SEX
SUPERSTITIOUS BEHAVIOR by LOC
BEHAVIOR by SEX
SEX
Count 
Exp Val 1| Row 2 I TotalBEHAVIOR ------- +----- +----- +
33
30.4
20
22.6
53
77.9%
6 9 15
8.6 6.4 22.1%
Column 39 29 68
Total 57.4% 42.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
1.54650 1 .21365
BEHAVIOR by LOC
BEHAVIOR
LOC
Count 
Exp Val
28
26.5
25 
26. 5
ROW 
2| Total 
■ - +
53 
77.9%
6 9 15
7.5 7.5 22.1%
Column 34 34 68
Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
.34214 1 .55860
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS: COMPLEXITY OF RESPONSE by SEX
COMPLEXITY OF RESPONSE by LOC
COMPLEXITY by SEX
SEX
Count Row
Exp Val 1| 2| Total
COMPLEX ------- +----- +----- +
3
1.6
1
2.4
1
1.6
3
2.4
4
26.7%
4
26.7%
2 5 7
2.8 4.2 46.7%
Column 6 9 15
Total 40.0% 60.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Pearson
Value DF Significance
2.79762 2 .24689
COMPLEXITY by LOC
COMPLEX
LOC
Count 
Exp Val 1|
Row 
2 I Total
0
1.6
4
2.4+ + +
3
1.6
1
2.4
4
26.7%
4
26.7%
3 4 7
2.8 4.2 46.7%
Column 6 9 15
Total 40.0% 60.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Pearson
Value DF Significance
4.73214 2 .09385
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS: PRESENCE OF TYPING SKILLS by SEX
PRESENCE OF TYPING SKILLS by LOC
PRESENCE OF TYPING SKILL by SEX
SEX
TYPING
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2 j Total
0 2
2.9
3
2.1
5
7.4%+ + +
37 26 63
36.1 26.9 92.6%
Column 39 29 68
Total 57.4% 42.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
.11929 1 .72980
PRESENCE OF TYPING SKILL by LOC
LOC
TYPING
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2| Total
2
2.5
3
2.5
5
7.4%
32 31 63
31.5 31.5 92.6%
Column 34 34 68
Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
.00000 1 1.00000
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS: METHOD OF MANIPULATING KEYBOARD by SEX
METHOD OF MANIPULATING KEYBOARD by LOC
METHOD OF MANIPULATING KEYBOARD by SEX
SEX
METHOD
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2 I Total
28
28.7
22
21.3
6
5.7
4
4.3
5
4.6
3
3.4
50
73.5%
10
14.7%
8
11.8%
Column 39 29 68
Total 57.4% 42.6% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Pearson
Value DF Significance
.15271 2 .92649
METHOD OF MANIPULATING KEYBOARD by LOC
LOC
METHOD
Count 
Exp Val
Row
1j 2 I Total
23
25.0
27
25.0
5
5. 0
5
5.0
50
73.5%
10
14.7%
6 2 8
4.0 4.0 11.8%
Column 34 34 68
Total 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square
Pearson
Value DF Significance
2.32000 2 .31349
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ANOVA: LENGTH OF SUPERSTITIOUS RESPONSE
LENGTH by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 1.531 2 . 766 .203 . 820
A .420 1 .420 .111 .745
B 1.253 1 1.253 .332 .576
2-Way Interactions .252 1 .252 .067 .801
A B .252 1 .252 .067 .801
Explained 1.783 3 .594 .157 .923
Residual 41.550 11 ' 3.777
Total 43 . 333 14 3.095
ANOVA: TIME TO ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERSTITIOUS RESPONSE
TIME TO ESTABLISHMENT by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 43128.805 2 21564.403 .367 .701
A 21101.427 1 21101.427 .359 .561
B 17254.627 1 17254.627 .294 .599
2-Way Interactions 725.208 1 725.208 .012 .914
A B 725.208 1 725.208 .012 .914
Explained 43854.013 3 14618.004 .249 .861
Residual 646294.880 11 58754.080
Total 690148.893 14 49296.350
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ANOVA: TIME TO EXTINCTION
SCORE
TIME TO EXTINCTION by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Source of Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F
Sig 
of F
Main Effects .415 2 .208 .002 .998
A .413 1 .413 .005 .947
B .015 1 .015 .000 .990
2-Way Interactions 14.249 1 14.249 .158 . 698
A B 14.249 1 14.249 .158 .698
Explained 14.664 3 4.888 .054 .982
Residual 990.009 11 90.001
Total 1004.673 14 71.762
ANOVA: CARS
CARS by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 579.488 2 289.744 1. 630 .204
A 8.767 1 8.767 .049 .825
B 579.098 1 579.098 3.258 .076
2-Way Interactions 493.711 1 493.711 2.777 . 101
A B 493.711 1 493.711 2.777 . 101
Explained 1073.198 3 357.733 2 . 012 . 121
Residual 11377.316 64 177.771
Total 12450.515 67 185.829
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ANOVA: STAI STATE SCALE
STAI STATE by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F Of F
Main Effects 794.636 2 397.318 3.391 .040
A 56.754 1 56.754 .484 .489
B 662.653 1 662.653 5.655 .020
2-Way Interactions 45.729 1 45.729 . 390 . 534
A B 45.729 1 45.729 .390 .534
Explained 840.365 3 280.122 2. 391 .077
Residual 7499.576 64 117.181
Total 8339.941 67 124.477
ANOVA: STAI TRAIT SCALE
STAI TRAIT by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 1108.919 2 554.460 6.002 .004
A 60.551 1 60.551 . 655 .421
B 1100.618 1 1100.618 11.915 .001
2-Way Interactions 205.833 1 205.833 2.228 .140
A B 205.833 1 205.833 2.228 . 140
Explained 1314.752 3 438.251 4.744 .005
Residual 5911.998 64 92.375
Total 7226.750 67 107.862
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ANOVA: POMS T SCALE
POMS T by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 76.550 2 38.275 1. 059 .353
A 35.241 1 35.241 .975 .327
B 29.956 1 29.956 .829 . 366
2-Way Interactions 22.186 1 22.186 .614 .436
A B 22.186 1 22.186 .614 .436
Explained 98.735 3 32.912 .911 .441
Residual 2313.074 64 36.142 ........
Total 2411.809 67 35.997
ANOVA: POMS D SCALE
POMS D by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 28.809 2 14.405 .419 . 659
A 17.280 1 17.280 . 503 .481
B 7.506 1 7.506 .219 . 642
2-Way Interactions 91.212 1 91.212 2.656 . 108
A B 91.212 1 91.212 2.656 . 108
Explained 120.022 3 40.007 1.165 .330
Residual 2198.213 64 34.347
Total 2318.235 67 34.601
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ANOVA: POMS A SCALE
POMS A by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Source of Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F
Sig 
of F
Main Effects 82.410 2 41.205 1.088 .343
A 82.175 1 82.175 2.169 .146
B 3.339 1 3 . 339 . 088 .767
2-Way Interactions 1.673 1 1.673 .044 .834
A B 1.673 1 1.673 .044 .834
Explained 84.083 3 28.028 .740 .532
Residual 2424.446 64 37.882
Total 2508.529 67 37.441
\
ANOVA: POMS V SCALE
POMS V by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 220-700 2 110.350 2.533 . 087
A 22.818 1 22.818 .524 .472
B 174.254 1 174.254 4 . 000 . 050
2-Way Interactions .046 1 .046 . 001 .974
A B .046 1 .046 .001 .974
Explained 220.746 3 73.582 1.689 . 178
Residual 2788.018 64 43.563
Total 3008.765 67 44.907
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ANOVA: POMS F SCALE
POMS F by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F Of F
Main Effects 27.396 2 13.698 .290 .749
A 14.161 1 14.161 .300 . 586
B 17.281 1 17.281 .366 .547
2-Way Interactions 165.711 1 165.711 3 .512 .066
A B 165.711 1 165.711 3.512 . 066
Explained 193.107 3 64.369 1.364 .262
Residual 3020.Oil 64 ~ 47 .188
Total 3213.118 67 47.957
ANOVA: POMS C SCALE
POMS C by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 174.721 2 87.360 4.298 . 018
A .000 1 .000 .000 .997
B 170.802 1 170.802 8.403 .005
2-Way Interactions 41.451 1 41.451 2.039 . 158
A B 41.451 1 41.451 2.039 . 158
Explained 216.172 3 72.057 3.545 .019
Residual 1300.814 64 20.325
Total 1516.985 67 22.642
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ANOVA: FRUSTRATION BEFORE THE EXTINCTION trial
FRUSTRATION BEFORE by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 4.348 2 2.174 2.191 . 120
A .087 1 .087 .087 .769
B 4.348 1 4.348 4.382 .040
2-Way Interactions 1.405 1 1.405 1.416 .239
A B 1.405 1 1.405 1.416 .239
Explained 5.753 3 1.918 1.933 .133
Residual 62.515 63 .992
Total 68.269 66 1.034
ANOVA: FRUSTRATION AFTER THE EXTINCTION TRIAL
FRUSTRATION AFTER by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 11.095 2 5.548 3 .116 .051
A .320 1 . 320 .180 .673
B 10.071 1 10.071 5.657 .020
2-Way Interactions 2.541 1 2.541 1.427 .237
A B 2.541 1 2.541 1.427 .237
Explained 13.636 3 4.545 2.553 .063
Residual 112.155 63 1.780
Total 125.791 66 1. 906
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ANOVA: AGE OF SUBJECT
AGE by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Source of Variation
Sum of 
Squares DF
Mean
Square F
Sig 
of F
Main Effects 228.289 2 114.145 2 . 107 . 130
A 37.171 1 37.171 .686 .411
B 212.499 1 212.499 3.922 .052
2-Way Interactions 29.010 1 29.010 .535 .467
A B 29.010 1 29.010 .535 .467
Explained 257.299 3 85.766 1.583 .202
Residual 3467.465 64 54.179
Total 3724.765 67 55.594
ANOVA: TYPING ABILITY
TYPING ABILITY by A (SEX)
B (LOC)
Sum of Mean Sig
Source of Variation Squares DF Square F of F
Main Effects 12.519 2 6.260 1.372 .261
A 11.799 1 11.799 2.586 . 113
B .108 1 .108 .024 .878
2-Way Interactions 8.118 1 8.118 1.779 .187
A B 8.118 1 8.118 1.779 . 187
Explained 20.638 3 6.879 1.508 .221
Residual 291.995 64 4.562
Total 312.632 67 4.666
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CHI-SQUARE ASSOCIATION: BELIEF BY BEHAVIOR
BELIEF by BEHAVIOR
BELIEF
Count 
Exp Val
BEHAVIOR
0
ROW 
l| Total
37
32.0
4
9.0
41
60.3%
16 11 27
21.0 6.0 39.7%
Column 53 15 68
Total 77.9% 22.1% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value 
7.37753
DF Significance
1 .00660
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REPEATED MEASURES ANOVA: FRUSTRATION
Cell Means and Standard Deviations:
Variable .. Frustration Before the Extinction Trial (Bl)
FACTOR CODE Mean St Dev N 95% Conf Int
A1 LOC Internal 1.848 .939 33 1.515 2.182
A2 External 2.353 1.041 34 1.990 2.716
For entire sample 2.104 1.017 67 1.856 2.353
Variable .. Frustration After the Extinction Trial (B2)
FACTOR CODE Mean St Dev N 95% Conf Int
A1 LOC Internal 2.727 1.376 33 2.240 3.215
A2-....... __ External 3.529 1.285 34 3.081 3.978
For entire sample 3.134 1.381 67 2.798 3.471
♦ A N A L Y S I S  O F  V A R I A N C E —  DESIGN 1 *
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects.
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for B using UNIQUE sums of 
squares
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F
WITHIN CELLS 125.80 65 1.94
A 14.29 1 14.29 7.39 .008
♦ A N A L Y S I S  O F  V A R I A N C E  —  DESIGN 1 ♦ 
Tests involving 'B' Within-Subject Effect.
AVERAGED Tests of Significance for B using UNIQUE sums of 
squares
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F
WITHIN CELLS 53.23 65 .82
B 35.37 1 35.37 43.19 .000
A BY B .74 1 .74 .91 .345
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CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS:
SUPERSTITIOUS BEHAVIORS WITHOUT BELIEFS by SEX 
SUPERSTITIOUS BEHAVIORS WITHOUT BELIEFS by LOC
BEH W/O BEL by SEX
SEX
Count 
Exp Val 1|BEH W/O BEL------ +----- +----- +
ROW 
2| Total
0 23
22.6
14
14.4
37
90.2%+ + +
2 2 4
2.4 1.6 9.8%
Column 2 5 16 41
Total 61.0% 39.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
.00000 1 1.00000
BEH W/O BEL by LOC
LOC
Count 
Exp Val
Row 
2 I Total
BEH W/O BEL------ +----- +----- +
0 24 
22. 6
13 
14 .4
37
90.2%
1 3  4
2.4 1.6 9.8%
Column 25 16 41
Total 61.0% 39.0% 100.0%
Chi-Square 
Continuity Correction
Value DF Significance
1.02656 1 .31097
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